While most firmly, fully and finally endorsing zero tolerance policy for acts of terror and acts against nation, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Joginder Singh @ Joginder Rana vs National Investigation Agency in Crl.A 799/2023 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:301-DB that was pronounced on January 17, 2025 and finally corrected and released on 21st January, 2025 and that was heard through the hybrid mode as revealed in para 1 has minced absolutely just no words whatsoever to hold most unequivocally that long incarceration in itself cannot lead to an accused being released on bail where the case involves transnational terrorism and anti-national activities.

This is because as my very best friend Sageer Khan pointed out in 1993 in Sagar in Madhya Pradesh that:
An ordinary criminal like a murderer or a robber or a rapist or a dacoit pose a threat to one or few individuals but terrorists are a threat not to one or few individuals but to our very nation against whom they declare war and are supported in all manner, supplied smuggled weapons from across the border and stimulated by them to kill as many as possible and do acts by which unity of India is destroyed and those who do riots are synonymous of terrorists for whom there should be no mercy!

There is no terrorism in Saudi Arabia because terrorists are crushed ruthlessly treating it as a war against the nation but in India the root cause for terrorism blooming is that they are treated like ordinary criminals and this alone explains why they enjoy mercy petition and you see killers of late Mr Rajiv Gandhi who is former PM not hanged even after two years.

The only punishment for terror acts must be death, death and nothing but death as it is a war against nation and individual rights even legal cannot be above our nation and national security cannot be ever comprised under any circumstances. Most strangely, when there is no ceasefire for rapists or dacoits or other criminals then why we see ceasefire for terrorists who have no religion and are indoctrinated by enemy nations like Pakistan directly and indirectly by USA, UK and China among others!

We see that even in 2025 after more than 33 years the killers were not hanged and let off lightly! Same we see in many other cases also! What is most terrible is that mercy petition not abolished even in revised penal laws nor time limit fixed for deciding it nor mandatory death penalty inserted for terror acts as my very best friend Sageer Khan wanted!

We need to note that a Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Prathiba M Singh and Hon’ble Mr Justice Dharmesh Sharma sent a very loud and clear message most unequivocally that:
Moreover, while speedy trial and liberty of an individual are of utmost importance, in cases involving anti-national activities, terrorism, involvement with dreaded gangsters where there is a clear possibility of continued involvement, the considerations of bail cannot be the same. It also needs to be borne in mind that the Division Bench made these pertinent observations while dismissing the bail appeal of Joginder Rana who is father of gangster Kala Rana and an alleged member of dreaded gangster Lawrence Bishnoi organised terror-crime syndicate which has spread its deep tentacles not only in just India alone but even in abroad where they get official patronage like USA, UK, China, Pakistan and Canada! It is high time and all the Courts including the Supreme Court must always display zero tolerance policy towards terror acts and Centre must again amend revised penal laws so that terror acts are not punished promptly but terrorists are hanged at the earliest!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Ms Justice Prathiba Singh for a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of herself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Dharmesh Sharma sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
The present appeal has been filed on behalf of the Appellant-Joginder Singh @ Joginder Rana under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter, the ‘NIA Act, 2008’) assailing the impugned order dated 10th May, 2023, passed by the Special Judge (NIA), ASJ-03, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in FIR No. RC-39/2022/NIA/DLI dated 26th August, 2022, registered under Section 120 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, the ‘IPC, 1860’) and Section 17/18/18B of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter, ‘UAPA, 1967’), at the P.S. NIA, New Delhi. Further, vide the present petition, the Appellant seeks grant of Regular bail.

Briefly stated, the Division Bench states in para 3 that:
Vide the impugned order the application of the Appellant seeking grant of Regular bail has been dismissed.

To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 4 while elaborating on facts of case that:
A brief background of the present case is that a raid was conducted by the National Investigation Agency (‘NIA’) on 12th September, 2022 at the residential premises of the Appellant, being, 438, Laxmi Garden, Yamunanagar, Haryana. During the said raid, the NIA recovered various weapons, ammunition, bank passbooks, mobile phones, etc. The same were seized by the NIA vide seizure memo dated 12th September, 2022. The Appellant was arrested on 1st October, 2022.

As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 5 that:
The Appellant herein then sought bail from the NIA Court. However, vide the impugned order dated 10th May 2023, the Special Judge (NIA), ASJ-03, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi dismissed the bail application filed on behalf of the Appellant. Hence, the present appeal.

Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 6 that:
Notice was issued in the present appeal on 21st November, 2023. Thereafter, the Court substantially heard the matter on 25th September, 2024, 28th November, 2024 and 15th January, 2025.

While citing relevant case laws, the Division Bench hastens to add in para 33 that:
Moreover, the above judgments relied upon by the ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, have also been considered by this Court in Jagtar Singh Johal @ Jaggi v. National Investigation Agency (2024:DHC:7110-DB) wherein, while relying on the principles of Gurwinder Singh (supra), the Court inter alia held that Cases involving serious crimes could be of various categories, such as offences relating to laundering of money, offences related to counterfeit currency, terrorist acts, etc. Acts of Terrorism and association with banned organisations which have international networks as also acts against the nation have to be considered as a distinct and more serious category of offences.

In such cases, it is imperative for the Court to adjudicate not merely on the facts of one particular FIR but on a larger canvas as such acts can cause immense damage in terms of loss of life. The Court further held that while speedy trial and personal liberty, as in the present case, is necessary as a Constitutional prescription, in cases involving anti national activities, grant of bail ought to be considered with a stricter brush. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereinunder:

76. Cases involving serious crimes could be of various categories, such as offences relating to laundering of money, offences related to counterfeit currency, terrorist acts, etc. Acts of Terrorism and association with banned organisations which have international networks as also acts against the nation have to be considered as a distinct and more serious category of offences. All offences covered under the UAPA cannot be treated with the same brush. Even for the purpose of grant of bail, such offences are not to be examined on the basis of mere facts of one particular FIR but on a larger canvas in the overall scheme of the multiple FIRs, if existing, against a particular accused. The damage in terms of loss of life as also the intent behind such attacks i.e., to destabilise the law and order situation as well as to strike terror in the minds of people in or outside India, has to be considered for the purposes of granting bail.

Terrorist activities, which have trans-national links, would also fall in a more serious and grave category of cases. Accused, who are involved in such activities, could be working overtly and covertly. The fact that they could be linked through dark networks which are easily not traceable needs to be borne in mind. Investigating agencies face enormous challenges in unearthing evidence in such cases. While speedy trial is necessary as a Constitutional prescription, in cases involving anti-national activities and that too terrorism at an international scale, long incarceration in itself ought not to lead to enlargement on bail when facts show involvement in such activities. In the case of persons associated with terrorist or unlawful organizations having their activities spanning across countries, the consideration for grant of bail in such serious offences ought to be strictly dealt with, as prescribed in the statute(UAPA), on the benchmarks contained in Section 43D(5) of the Act.

Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 34 that:
A perusal of the seizure memo dated 12th September, 2022 coupled with the articles and goods which have been recovered from the Appellant’s own residence would show that a large cache of weapons such as pistols, wooden guns, etc. as also ammunitions and several expensive mobile phones, were found in the room of the Appellant’s house. The house is stated to be owned by the Appellant’s wife. It was their regular residence. Moreover, the Appellant as also his wife are the pairokar for both sons, one of whom, had in fact absconded to Thailand and extradition proceedings had to be initiated. Though the Appellant claims that he has, in fact, disowned the son, he and his wife still continue to remain the pairokars for the older son, Kala Rana. He was also the pairokar for the second son, Noni, who has obtained bail and has now absconded. The involvement with such criminal gangs which are involved in transnational killings cannot be ruled out at this stage.

Do further note, the Division Bench notes in para 35 that:
In the present case, a large quantum of weapons, expensive mobile phones, ammunitions, etc. were found from the residence of the Appellant as captured in the seizure memo dated 12th September, 2022. In these circumstances, a prima facie opinion against the innocence of the Appellant is drawn by the Court as it is not normal or justifiable to find incriminating evidence of this quantity at someone’s residence. Moreover, applying the triple test of bail jurisprudence in this case, the Appellant herein has a son who has already absconded from bail to Thailand and had to be extradited back to India. The Appellant is the pairokar of his son. Further, the Appellant was convicted in FIR No. 796/2018, PS. City Jagadhri, Haryana under Section 174A IPC, 1860 vide judgment dated 25th July, 2023 for being an absconder in FIR No. 826/2017. There are also allegations made by the NIA that the Appellant herein has a substantial base in Thailand and the chances of flight risk are quite high. Moreover, the deep-rooted involvement of the entire family leads this Court to believe that the Appellant’s propensity to indulge in continued illegal activity and support for LB’s gang is also quite high.

Quite significantly, the Division Bench holds in para 36 that:
The inability of the defense to refute these allegations, is enough for this Court, at this stage, to hold that the Appellant does not satisfy the triple test of bail jurisprudence. This view is taken by the Court in the light of the Gurwinder Singh (supra) wherein it is inter alia held that the question of entering the ‘second test’ of the inquiry will not arise if the Appellant is unable to pass the ‘first test’. In the overall circumstances of the case, the accused will have to show that he successfully passes the ‘tripod test’.

Most significantly, the Division Bench then encapsulates aptly in para 37 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, Moreover, while speedy trial and liberty of an individual are of utmost importance, in cases involving anti-national activities, terrorism, involvement with dreaded gangsters where there is a clear possibility of continued involvement, the considerations of bail cannot be the same. Recently, in the judgment of Neeraj Sehrawat @ Neeraj Bawaniya (2025:DHC:176) a ld. Single Judge of this Court observed that speedy trial cannot be a `free pass’ for every undertrial, demanding that he be enlarged on bail regardless of his criminal antecedents and the nature of offence. The Court must consider the larger interest of society and the same must prevail over the individual right of an undertrial. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:

23. To reiterate, in the present case, bail is not being denied so as to inflict pre-trial punishment upon the petitioner, but in view of the petitioner’s grave criminal antecedents and demonstrable recidivistic tendencies, as discussed above. It may be said that the right to speedy trial derived from Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not a ‘free-pass’ for every undertrial, demanding that he be enlarged on bail regardless of his criminal antecedents and the nature of the offence. In matters such as this, the larger interests of society must prevail over the individual rights of an undertrial.

It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench notes in para 38 that, The innocence of the Appellant at this stage cannot be said to be prima facie, proved under the rigours of Section 43D(5) UAPA, 1967 as both the sons were in custody at the time, when the search was conducted at the Appellant’s house. Therefore, it is implausible for the Court to believe that such a large quantum of expensive mobile phones and the whole cache of weapons which were found including guns and live cartridges, etc. could have been stored without his knowledge, in his own residence where he and his wife reside.

To be sure, it cannot be glossed over that the Division Bench points out in para 39 that:
Even if the Court does not take the testimonies of the protected witnesses into consideration, the presence of the Appellant at his residence at the time when the seizure was effected and the fact that both the sons were in judicial custody when the seizure was effected, persuades this Court to reasonably believe at prima facie that the allegations against the Appellant are true, which is the standard to be considered under 43D(5) of the UAPA, 1967.

As a corollary, the Division Bench then propounds in para 40 stating that, Therefore, the opinion of this Court is that the allegations against the Appellant are prima facie true and the Appellant is unable to prove his innocence at this stage or is able to give any valid explanation for the presence of the seized goods at his residence.

Resultantly, the Division Bench then holds in para 41 that:
In view thereof, applying all the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, this Court is not inclined to grant bail in the present case.

Finally, the Division Bench concludes by holding in para 42 that:
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed and disposed of in the above terms.

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh