Sexual Assault Under POCSO Can’t Be Quashed Based On ‘Compromise’, Offence Is Heinous & Not Of Private Nature: SC

Sexual Assault Under POCSO Can’t Be Quashed Based On ‘Compromise’, Offence Is Heinous & Not Of Private Nature: SC
Ramji Lal Bairwavs Rajasthan the Rajasthan High Court had quashed the matter that was primarily based on a ‘compromise’ between the victim’s father and teacher.

It is definitely in the fitness of things that the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr vs State of Rajasthan & Ors in Criminal Appeal No. 3403 of 2023 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 12912 of 2022) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024 INSC 846 and so also in 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 865 that was pronounced as recently as on November 7, 2024 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has set aside the Rajasthan High Court’s decision which quashed the ‘sexual assault’ complaint against a teacher who was accused of rubbing the victim’s breast. Quite strangely, the Rajasthan High Court had quashed the matter that was primarily based on a ‘compromise’ between the victim’s father and teacher. It must be also noted that aggrieved by the quashing of the FIR, the appellant who was an ordinary village men then approached the Apex Court.

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice CT Ravikumar for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Sanjay Kumar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The renowned American poet H. W. Longfellow penned to the effect that a torn jacket might soon be mended, but a bruised heart of a child would be beyond reviviscence. Certainly, it contains the gospel truth as relates a child subjected to sexual assault, be it aggravated or penetrative; or any kind of sexual abuse or exploitation. It is more so, in the case of a female child as it may hound her and hack her family life.

On pedagogy Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in ‘De Officiis’ (on duties) said: What nobler employment, or more valuable to the State, than that of the man who instructs the rising generation?

To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on facts of case envisages in para 2 that:
May be a jinx on pedagogy unfortunate, unconscionable and unpardonable things happen, though not often-times. The following factual narration will unravel the raison d’etre for the above prelude: - FIR No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 was registered at Sardar Gangapur City Police Station, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan at the instance of the 4th respondent, the father of the victim involved in the case, against the 3rd respondent herein under Sections 354A, 342, 509 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the SC/ST Act’).

The allegations thereunder are to the effect that on 06.01.2022 when the victim child, then a student of Class XI in Higher Secondary School was alone in the classroom, the 3rd respondent, who is a teacher, came there. After gazing through the window to ensure that nobody is there near to the classroom, he reached behind her and started patting her cheeks and soon put his hand inside bodice and rubbed her breast. In anguish and anger, she got up and ran away. The accused followed to stop her and hurled abuses with ugly words like ‘dedh Chamar’ etc.

Thereupon, she sat down near the gate and beseeched the teachers for help, but it was of no avail. They persuaded her to be tightlipped about the incident. Though, the Principal came to know about it, he only took her signature on a blank paper. Meanwhile, one teacher came to the residence of the 4th respondent and took his wife to the school telling that her daughter was not feeling well. On reaching there his wife found the daughter in a deadly terrified and numbed state and she could say nothing to the mother. But, on reaching home, she divulged the incident, to the mother viz., the wife of the 4th respondent and she, in turn, informed him on his mobile phone as he was away in another village for employment purpose. On the next day, the 4th respondent came back home and the victim narrated the whole incident to him and then, he lodged the aforesaid FIR.

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 3 that:
Obviously, the subject FIR was filed on 08.01.2022. The third respondent herein compromised the matter with the fourth respondent, who is the father of the victim, on 31.01.2022 and thereupon, moved S.B (Crl.) Misc. Petition No.1348/2022 before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking quashment of the said FIR and all further proceedings thereon. As per the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 the High Court, despite the opposition by the learned public prosecutor, allowed the said petition and quashed the subject FIR and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof. The impugned order would reveal that based on the fact that the 3rd respondent has settled the dispute amicably with the 4th respondent and relying on the decision of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, the High Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings therefrom. The High Court held thus:-

…The offence alleged in this matter is non compoundable, however Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303] has propounded that if it is convinced that offences are entirely personal in nature and do not affect the public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the same by exercising the inherent powers vested in it. It is observed that in such cases, the prosecution becomes the lame prosecution and pursuing such a lame prosecution would be a waste of time and energy.

That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. This court is aptly guided by the principles propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se between the parties, either they are relatives, neighbours or having business relationship and which does not affect the society at large, then in such cases, with a view to maintain harmonious relationships between the two sides & for restitution of relationship. and with a view to end-up the dispute in between them permanently, the High Court should exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR and all other subsequent proceedings initiated thereto.

Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 22 that:
The case on hand is not one where the third party sought leave to challenge a judgment of acquittal. In the case on hand, the very FIR registered against the third respondent for the serious offences, as mentioned above, was quashed by the High Court invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. solely based on the fact that a compromise was arrived at between the third and the fourth respondents, as mentioned above. It is a fact that the compromise was acted upon despite the opposition of the public prosecutor and even then, the State has not chosen to file petition seeking leave to challenge the order passed by the High Court.

Though, the fourth respondent is the father of the victim, who suffered sexual assault and such other offences under the POCSO Act and IPC offences in view of the fact that he had compromised the offences with the third respondent accused, and in view of the manner in which he supports the impugned order, it is evident that he would not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. While considering the locus standi of the appellants to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 the aforesaid aspects are also to be borne in mind. The appellants are ordinary men residing in the very same village to which the fourth respondent belong. There is absolutely no case for the third and fourth respondents that they filed the Special Leave Petition due to any private revenge or personal vendetta.

No ill motive has been attributed on them. We have already taken note of the fact that the very object and purpose of enactment of the POCSO Act and also taken note of the offences alleged against the third respondent which are heinous and serious in nature. The definition to crimes by Blackstone was taken note of in P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s case (supra) by this Court as the breach and violation of public rights and duties which affect the whole community to observe that in such circumstances a crime is an act deemed by law to be harmful to society in general, even though its immediate victim is an individual.

In view of the nature of the offences alleged against the third respondent, one can only say that if they are proved they could be treated only as offences against the society and at any rate, it cannot be said that prosecuting an offender against whom such allegations are made is not in the interest of the society. In fact, it would only be in the interest of the society. In that view of the matter, when by quashing the FIR by invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the accused was relieved of the liability to face the trial coupled with the aforesaid circumstances and the position of law qua locus standi of third party to maintain a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, as revealed from the decisions referred above, we have no hesitation to hold that the challenge based on the appellants’ locus standi got no merit at all. We do not think it necessary to deal with the other decisions cited before us on the aforesaid question. In short, we find no ground or reason to revoke the grant of leave to the appellants to assail the order dated 04.02.2024.

Most significantly, what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then postulated in para 32 wherein it is mandated that:
In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash the proceedings viz., Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the decision in Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra) in unambiguous terms this Court held that the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. When an incident of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and have no serious impact on the society.

Most forthrightly and as a corollary, the Bench then propounds in para 33 holding that:
In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the light of the decisions referred supra, the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022, quashing the FIR No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 and all further proceedings pursuant thereto solely on the ground that the accused and the complainant had settled the matter, invites interference.

We have no hesitation to hold that in cases of this nature, the fact that in view of compromise entered into between the parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and bleak also cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation, by quashing FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In the said circumstances, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the FIR No.6/2022, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law.

For sake of clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 34 stating that:
We make it clear that we shall not be understood to have made any observations on the merits of the case.

Finally, the Bench concludes by holding in para 35 that:
Before parting with this case, we would render our gratitude and appreciation for the invaluable assistance provided to the Court by Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel as amicus curiae, ably assisted by Mr. Aviral Saxena, Advocate on Record.

In sum, we thus see that the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear that sexual assault under POCSO can’t be quashed based on compromise as the offence is heinous and is not private in nature and has a huge impact on society. The Apex Court rightly cited judgment in State of MP vs Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688 which held that an offence against the society could not be compromised. It also cited among other judgments the Delhi High Court judgment also in Sunil Raikwar vs State and Another which held that a POCSO Act offence cannot be permitted to be settled.

It definitely merits no reiteration that there must be absolute zero tolerance for such sexual assaults and those who dare to perpetrate such heinous crimes must be made to face the consequences and not be allowed to get away easily under any circumstances by entering into a compromise which makes a complete mockery of our criminal justice system and berates the paramount dignity and well being of victims which cannot be allowed to happen under any circumstances! No denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh