Preface
We can ill afford to ignore or gloss over what the Supreme Court which is the top court in our country while perusing a murder case trial has ruled most recently on January 24, 2024 in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Raja Nayyakar vs State of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 902 of 2023 and cited in Neutral Citation No. : 2024 INSC 56 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that securing a conviction necessitates more than mere suspicion and the prosecution bears the burden of unequivocally proving that the accused and only the accused committed the crime. We must note here that the Apex Court observed so while acquitting the murder accused who was concurrently convicted by the Trial Court and the Chhattisgarh High Court. To put it differently, the Apex Court has made it crystal clear that for conviction to take place in murder cases, the proof must be beyond reasonable doubt and it cannot be substituted by mere strong suspicion. The benefit of doubt in such cases has to go to the accused and so it was but natural that the accused in this leading case got acquitted.

Introduction
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice BR Gavai for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Mehta sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
This appeal challenges the judgement and order dated 22nd July, 2015, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in CRA No. 223 of 2012, thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the Appellant, namely, Raja Naykar (Accused No. 1) and confirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence awarded to him by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (Chhattisgarh) (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Judge) in Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2010 on 23rd November, 2011.

Factual Matrix
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on facts of case that:
Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are as under:

1. On 21st October, 2009, the half-burnt body of Shiva alias Sanwar (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) was found behind Baba Balak Nath temple near Shastri Nagar ground. Based on the information given by one, Pramod Kumar (P.W.3), merg intimation Ex. P-33 was registered against unknown persons.
    
2. The prosecution case, in a nutshell, is that Mohan – the husband of Accused No. 2 and brother of the Appellant was killed by the deceased; and as its offshoot, on 21st October, 2009 at about 12.00 a.m., the Appellant committed the murder of the deceased by causing 24 stab wounds on his body. He then wrapped the body in a blanket with the help of other accused persons, took it behind the Baba Balak Nath temple near Shastri Nagar ground where the half burnt body of the deceased was found in the following afternoon. Postmortem examination of the body of the deceased was conducted on 23rd October, 2009 by Dr. Ullhas Gonnade (P.W.11) who observed as many as 24 injuries on the deceased. According to P.W.11, after commission of murder, the body of the deceased was burnt and his death was homicidal in nature. It was further the case of the prosecution that an electricity bill in the name of one, Alakh Verma was found from the body of the deceased, on the basis of which the police proceeded with further investigation. In pursuance of the disclosure statements of the accused persons, seizure was effected and the police concluded that the deceased was murdered by the Appellant and that the body was then taken to the Baba Balak Nath temple with the help of the other accused persons where an attempt was made to burn the body.
    
3. At the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. Since the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the Sessions Judge.
    
4. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C) wherein they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the accused.
    
5. At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Judge found that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the Appellant had committed the murder of the deceased. The prosecution further proved that the accused persons committed criminal conspiracy to destroy the evidence, and threw the body of the deceased after burning the same behind the Baba Balak Nath temple. The prosecution also proved that accused no. 2 helped in throwing the body of the deceased and destroying evidence by way of cleaning the blood stains etc. of the deceased. Thus, the Trial Judge convicted the Appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC for short) and was awarded a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; whereas Accused Nos. 2 to 4 were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 201 read with 120B of IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.1,000/-.
    
6. Being aggrieved thereby, the Appellant and other accused persons preferred appeals before the High Court through CRA No. 223 of 2012 and CRA No. 38 of 2012 respectively. The High Court by the common impugned judgement, although allowed the appeal filed by the accused nos. 2 to 4; however, it dismissed the appeal filed by the present Appellant and affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded to the him by the Trial Judge.
    
7. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
    

Most forthrightly, the Bench mandates in para 9 that:
It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 10 that:
In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to examine the present case.

Do note, the Bench notes in para 14 that:
Undisputedly, the dead body was found much prior to the recording of the Memorandum of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, only that part of the statement which leads to recovery of the dagger and the rickshaw would be relevant.

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench points out in para 15 that:
The Property Seizure Memo would show that the dagger was seized from a place accessible to one and all. According to the prosecution, the incident took place on 21st October, 2009 and the recovery was made on 25th October, 2009.

It also cannot be lost on us that the Bench observes in para 16 that:
As per the FSL report, the blood stains found on the dagger were of human blood. However, the FSL report does not show that the blood found on the dagger was of the blood group of the deceased. Apart from that, even the serological report is not available.

What’s more, the Bench then rightly points out in para 17 that:
Insofar as the recovery of rickshaw is concerned, it is again from an open place accessible to one and all. It is difficult to believe that the owner of the rickshaw would remain silent when his rickshaw was missing for 3-4 days. As such, the said recovery would also not be relevant.

It also cannot be discounted that the Bench further adds in para 18 that, “Another circumstance relied on by the Trial Judge is with regard to recovery of blood-stained clothes on a Memorandum of the appellant. The said clothes were recovered from the house of the appellant’s sister-in-law. The alleged incident is of 21st October 2009, whereas the recovery was made on 25th October, 2009. It is difficult to believe that a person committing the crime would keep the clothes in the house of his sister-in-law for four days.

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 19 that:
It can thus be seen that, the only circumstance that may be of some assistance to the prosecution case is the recovery of dagger at the instance of the present appellant. However, as already stated hereinabove, the said recovery is also from an open place accessible to one and all. In any case, the blood found on the dagger does not match with the blood group of the deceased. In the case of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2011 SC 2769=2011 INSC 487, this Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapon cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the accused. Thus, we find that only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.

Most significantly, the Bench mandates and propounds in para 20 that:
As already discussed hereinabove, merely on the basis of suspicion, conviction would not be tenable. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it is only the accused and the accused alone who has committed the crime. We find that the prosecution has utterly failed to do so.

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 21 that:
Insofar as the finding of the High Court that the appellant has failed to give any explanation in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. is concerned, we find that the High Court has failed to appreciate the basic principle that it is only after the prosecution discharges its duty of proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt that the false explanation or non-explanation of the accused could be taken into consideration. In any case, as held by this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the non-explanation or false explanation of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used as an additional link to complete the chain of circumstances. It can only be used to fortify the conclusion of guilt already arrived at on the basis of other proven circumstances.

Conclusion
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 22 that:
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2015, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in CRA No. 223 of 2012 is quashed and set aside. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

All said and done, we see after having even a cursory glance of this notable judgment that one thing is indubitably clear: It is imperative that there is strong evidence beyond reasonable doubt against the accused in murder trial cases. It is also made abundantly clear by the top court that strong suspicion cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. There can be just no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh