In a stinging, stimulating and sharp observation, the Delhi High Court has as recently as on May 12, 2022 in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Jasbir Singh Vs State in CRL.A. 95/2007 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 439 observed without mincing any words that if the period of deprivation pending trial or disposal of criminal appeal becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 of the Constitution of India would receive a jolt.

The Court observed that:
It is conceded that some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation pending trial/disposal of criminal appeal becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. Justice Chandra Dhari Singh further added that the delay in disposal of criminal appeals pending in the High Court is matter of serious concern to all those involved in the administration of criminal justice. The Court also noted that in its 41st Report, the Law Commission had observed that the Criminal Appeals should be heard at earliest by the High Court to avoid miscarriage of justice and to secure a uniform standard in dealing with such criminal appeals.

To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by a single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, The instant criminal appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter Cr.P.C.) has been filed on behalf of the appellant against the impugned judgment and order dated 9 th January, 2007 and 15th January, 2007 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC), rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 506 of IPC. All the sentences to run concurrently.

To put things in perspective, the Bench then while dwelling on brief facts envisages in para 2 that:
The brief facts as per the prosecution case is that on 25th September, 1998, the daughter of the complainant aged about 15 years left the house for purchasing fruits and vegetables but she did not return home. A missing report was lodged vide DD No. 43B on 26th September, 1998. On 28th September, 1998, an FIR was registered on the basis of the said complaint. The victim was recovered from Village Behat, District Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh on 25th November, 1998.

On the statement of the prosecutrix, the accused Keshav was arrested by the Police. The statement of prosecutrix was recorded, wherein she stated that on 25th September, 1998, when she had gone to purchase fruits and vegetables, accused Jasbir met her and told her that her friend Sharda had called her at the bus stand of route no. 817. She refused but when Jasbir insisted, she accompanied him. On reaching the bus stand of route no. 817, she found that her friend Sharda was not there but accused Anand Singh and Keshav were present. She was threatened and was taken to a room, where Keshav kept her. She was regularly threatened and raped by co-accused Keshav against her wishes.

As it turned out, the Bench then states in para 3 that:
After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the accused persons, including the present appellant. After complying with the provisions of Section 207 of the Cr. P.C., learned Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial. All the accused persons were charged for the offence punishable under Section 366 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 506 read with Section 34 of IPC and accused Keshav was also charged for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

Needless to say, the Bench then adds in para 4 that:
To bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses. PW-1 Head Constable Ishwar Singh, PW-2 Lady Constable Urshla, PW-3 the prosecutrix, PW-4 Sh. Moti Ram, complainant (father of the prosecutrix), PW-5 Head Constable Amarjeet, PW-6 Constable Praveen, PW-7 Head Constable Sant Ram, PW-8 SI Narayan Singh, PW-9 Constable Heera Lal, PW-10 SI Suresh Chand, PW-11 ASI Yashpal, PW-12 Dr. Preeti Singh, PW-13 Dr. Vineet Kumar and PW-14 Sh. Praveen Kumar.

After completion of the prosecution witnesses, statement of accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. wherein they denied all the allegations and stated that they have been falsely implicated. The appellant Jasbir Singh had also stated that he was innocent and he did not know the prosecutrix, friend of the prosecutrix, Sharda, or the complainant, Moti Ram. The appellant prayed to lead defence evidence, but no defence evidence was examined by him.

As we see, the Bench then notes in para 5 that:
After completion of the trial, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 76/2002, convicted the present appellant for the offence punishable under Section 366 read with Section 34 of IPC and for offence punishable under Section 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months, rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months respectively. All the sentences to run concurrently. Hence, the present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence on the ground of validity, propriety and illegality.

Simply put, the Bench then observes in para 38 that:
The instant criminal appeal has been pending since 2007 in this Court for disposal. The appellant was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 366/506/34 of the IPC vide judgment/order dated 9th January, 2007 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. The incident took place on 25th September, 1998.

Most significantly, the Bench then states what forms the cornerstone of this notable judgment in para 39 that:
The delay in disposal of criminal appeals pending in the High Court is matter of serious concern to all those involved in the administration of criminal justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the fact that speedy trial or disposal of the criminal appeals pending before High Courts are a fundamental right implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid Article confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has also been emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the procedure so prescribed must ensure a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. It is conceded that some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation pending trial/disposal of criminal appeal becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt.

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then mentions in para 40 that:
In the case of Sheela Barse v. Union of India: [1986] 3 SCR 562, The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

A Division Bench comprising Bhagwati and R.N. Misra, JJ. re-affirmed that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and observed the consequence of violation of fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right.

While referring to yet another relevant case law, the Bench then observes in para 41 that:
In the case of Srinivas Gopal v. Union of Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, (Now State) 1988 1 SCR 477, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings against the appellant on the ground of delay in investigation and commencement of trial. In this case, investigation commenced in November, 1976 and the case was registered on completion of the investigation in September, 1977. Cognizance was taken by the court in March, 1986. These facts were held sufficient to quash the proceedings particularly when the offence charged was a minor one namely, Section 304-A read with 338 of I.P.C.

While citing a case law of USA, the Bench then points out in para 42 that:
In Strunk v. United States, 37 Law Edn. 2Nd 56, it was held that an accused’s right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial. It was observed that the desires or convenience of the accused or other individuals are of little relevance and make no difference to the prosecutor’s obligation to ensure a prompt trial. The main question considered in this case was whether the violation of the said guarantee entails dismissal of the charges.

It was held that dismissal of charges is the only possible remedy where a speedy trial has been denied. Indeed, in this case, the court of appeals was also of opinion that the accused’s right to speedy trial was denied but it did not quash the charges but directed merely that the sentence awarded to the accused should be reduced by the period of unconstitutional delay.

While referring to a very famous case law, the Bench then notes in para 43 that, In the case of Bell v. Director of Prosecution, Jamaica [1985] 2 A.E.R. 585, the Privy Council expressly affirmed the principles enunciated in Barker in the following words:

Their Lordships acknowledge the relevance and importance of the four factors lucidly expanded and comprehensively discussed in Barker v. Wingo. Their Lordships also acknowledge the desirability of applying the same or similar criteria to any constitution, written or unwritten, which protects an accused from oppression by delay in criminal proceedings. The weight to be attached to each factor must however vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case.

Furthermore, the Bench then states in para 44 that:
In the Criminal Appeal No. 509 of 2017, Hussain v. Union of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide judgment dated 9th March, 2017 held that delay in deciding the criminal appeals are violation of right of accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had framed the guidelines for speedy trial and disposal of criminal appeals.

Most remarkably, the Bench then acknowledges in para 45 that:
Delay in the context of justice denotes the time consumed in the disposal of case, in excess of the time within which a case can be reasonably expected to be decided by the Court. No one expects a case to be decided overnight. However, difficulty arises when the actual time taken for disposal of the case far exceeds its expected life span and that is when we say there is a delay in dispensation of justice. In its 41st Report, the Law Commission had observed that the Criminal Appeals should be heard at earliest by the High Court to avoid miscarriage of justice and to secure a uniform standard in dealing with such criminal appeals.

Be it noted, the Bench then without mincing any words holds in para 46 that:
In the instant case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The material contradictions in the ocular testimonies of PW-4, PW-6 and PW-7 about the date and time of the recovery of prosecutrix, age of the prosecutrix and also medical evidence does not support the ocular evidence regarding the rape of the prosecutrix. The present appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 366/506/34.

The FIR was lodged after two days and delay in lodging the FIR was also not explained. The instant criminal appeal has been pending since 2007 before this Court and the incident had taken place in the year of 1998. The age of the prosecutrix was not less than 18 years at the time of the incident.

It is worth noting that the Bench then mandates in para 47 that:
The appellate court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The appellate court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any, significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial court.

While allowing the appeal, the Bench then directs in para 48 that:
The prosecution case, when judged on the touchstone of totality of the facts and circumstances, does not generate the unqualified and unreserved satisfaction indispensably required to enter a finding of guilt against the appellant. Having regard to the evidence on record as a whole, it is not possible for this court to unhesitatingly hold that charge levelled against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In contrast, the findings of the trial court are decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by overlooking many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and omissions rendering the prosecution case unworthy of credit. This court is of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant to the hilt as obligated in law and thus, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed.

Quite glaringly, the Bench points out in para 49 that:
In case at hand, this Court finds that the material witness that is the mother of the prosecutrix, the friend of the prosecutrix namely Sharda have also not been examined and there are material contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and also there is no explanation for delay in lodging the FIR. There is no certain proof of age of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident.

Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 40 that:
After giving anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant and learned APP for State, in the light of circumstances discussed above, this Court finds substance in the contentions of the appellant that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt qua the present appellant as he was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 366/506/34 of IPC.

As a corollary, the Bench then directs in para 41 that:
Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and the impugned order/judgment dated 9 th January, 2007 and order on sentence dated 15th January, 2007 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi is set aside. The appellant is acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 366/506/34 of the IPC. Consequently, the bail bonds of the appellant, who was granted bail and extended time to time, stand cancelled.

What’s more, the Bench then adds in para 52 that:
Accordingly, the instant appeal is disposed of along with pending application, if any.

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 53 that:
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.

All told, the Delhi High Court has very rightly underscored the importance of disposing of criminal appeal in time. It has also minced just no words to highlight that delay in disposal of criminal appeals pending in the High Courts is a matter of utmost concern to all those involved in the administration of justice. The same must be addressed by lawmakers by taking the necessary requisite steps to ensure that cases are disposed of in time like appointing Judges in all posts which are lying vacant since a long time among many other steps! No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh