While clearing the air on when the FIR and chargesheet can be quashed, the Delhi High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Mr Abhishek Gupta & Anr v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. in CRL.M.C. 1064/2022 & CRL.M.A.4586/2022 (for stay) and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 213 has stated that the FIR and chargesheet can be quashed if the allegations made in the FIR or complaint or the evidence collected, though remaining uncontroverted, do not disclose the commission of an offence.

It must be mentioned here that the Court was dealing with a plea seeking quashing of chargesheet dated 4th December, 2021 emanating from an FIR registered with the Crime Branch, Rohini on the basis of a complaint lodged by the respondent No. 2 by way of an email addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. Justice Asha Menon was of the view that the decision of the Court to exercise or not to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC would be predicated on the facts of each case, however, while considering the facts, the court cannot embark on an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

To start with, the single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Asha Menon sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, The petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for the quashing of charge-sheet dated 4th December, 2021 emanating from FIR No.214/2021 dated 30th October, 2021 registered with the Crime Branch, Rohini, Sector 18, Delhi and all proceedings emanating therefrom. The FIR No.214/2021 was registered with the Crime Branch, Rohini on the basis of a complaint that was lodged with them on 19th October, 2020 by the respondent No.2 by way of an email addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi.

To put things in perspective, the Bench after observing in para 11 that:
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned ASG and considered the materials on record as well as the cited judgments. then envisages in para 12 that:
The Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal case (supra), after considering several judgments, distilled the principles governing the exercise of the extraordinary power of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Several categories of cases by way of illustrations were also listed out. It would be useful to reproduce the same for ready reference below:

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
    
2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
    
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
    
4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
    
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
    
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
    
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
    

On a note of caution, the Bench then observed in para 13 that:
At the same time, the Apex Court also recorded a note of caution in the following words:

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.

Be it noted, the Bench then enunciates in para 14 that:
It is very clear that the decision to exercise or not to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. would be predicated on the facts of each case but while considering the facts, the court cannot embark on an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. When seen on these touchstones, it is clear that the entire thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners is on the genuineness of the allegations made against the petitioners. Thus, there has been an emphasis on the fact that though the incident had occurred in Punjabi Bagh, it was an year later that the FIR was registered by the Crime Branch; that the possession of the respondent No.2 of the ground floor of property No.17/43, Punjabi Bagh (West), Delhi was unexplained on the basis of documents; that the relationship between the respondent No.2 and her husband was strained and it was not possible to believe that he would have permitted her to enter the premises by handing over the keys to her; that there were contradictions in the various complaints given to the Police; that the names of the petitioners and others were randomly taken and that there was mala fide in the registration of the complaint by the respondents and the entire case was absurd.

Most significantly, the Bench then underscores in para 15 that:
Suffice it to note here that these submissions reflecting on the reliability of the statements of the respondent No.2 or the genuineness of her complaint cannot be subject matter of the present proceedings. The court cannot weigh the material in such a fashion to determine the question of truth in the complaint. As observed in Bhajan Lal case (supra), it is when the allegations made in the FIR, if taken at face value alongwith other materials accompanying the FIR, do not disclose an offence, that the court would be justified in quashing the FIR. If the allegations made in the FIR or complaint or the evidence collected, though remaining uncontroverted, do not disclose the commission of an offence, then the FIR and charge-sheet could be quashed. Finally, if the allegations in the FIR or complaint were inherently improbable, then the FIR and charge-sheet could be quashed. None of these situations prevail in the present case.

Needless to say, the Bench then points out in para 16 that:
It is meaningless to argue that the respondent No.2 could not produce documents for her authorised entry into the premises, as the FIR is not against her. Admittedly, the petitioner No.2 claims to have gone to the premises (though alongwith the Police) and had found her there. The inter se rights of the parties i.e., the respondent No.2, her son and Mr. Sunil Datt, are for them to resolve. The petitioners cannot question whether or not Mr. Sunil Datt had allowed the mother and son entry into the ground floor as the son had sought such a right from his father, as averred by the respondent No.2 in her complaint.

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then hastens to add in para 17 that, The respondent No.2 has clearly stated that while she was staying at property No.17/43, Punjabi Bagh on 28th January, 2020, when she was in the house with her son Mr. Sahil Datt, petitioner No.2 Ajay Gupta of Ganpati Builders alongwith his goons forcibly entered her house and threatened her alongwith Smt. Janak Dulari, intending that they would be forced to vacate the house. They attempted to physically assault her. There was a video clipping of the incident and the matter was immediately reported to the Police vide DD No.50A dated 28th January, 2020.

On the next day, both petitioner No.2 Ajay Gupta and his son petitioner No.1 Mr. Abhishek Gupta again came to the house and threatened them, again intending with these threats, that the respondent No.2 and her son would vacate the premises. The incident was again brought to the notice of the Police. Another specific incident has been described as having occurred on 4 th February, 2020, when one Mr. Prakash Chand Sharma came to threaten them and when the Police arrived, he apologized and left.

There was also an allegation that the petitioner No.2 had sent one drunken man, namely Mr. Rajan Makkar, to the house when respondent No.2 was alone in the house and his vulgar actions had caused her much distress. Smt. Janak Dulari and her brother had also locked the main gate and abused her. On 20th August, 2020, Mr. Santosh Kapoor of Chattarpur alongwith a lady whose identity remained unknown, tried to forcibly open the main gate of the house and abused the respondent No.2 and her son, this time the intent being also that the respondent No.2 would be forced to withdraw the existing criminal cases under Sections 468, 467 and 420 IPC against Mr. Ashok Kanda (her brother-in-law) and the son-in-law of Smt. Janak Dulari and to accept a fabricated divorce decree.

Practically speaking, the Bench then notes in para 18 that:
If these allegations were to be taken at face value or they were to be treated as uncontroverted, they disclose the commission of various offences by the accused persons including the petitioners in cohort with each other. None of these allegations appear to be absurd or inherently improbable.

Quite rightly, the Bench then observes in para 19 that:
Even if the decision of the Supreme Court in Anand Kumar Mohatta’s case (supra) was to be followed, in that the petition for quashing under Section 482 can be considered even after the filing of the chargesheet, the facts distinguish that case from the present. In that case, there were several facts and circumstances which on the face of it disclosed a civil matter regarding refund of a payment of Rs.1,00,00,000/- by the complainant therein to the appellants therein, where the appellants were the owners of the immovable property in respect of which a Development Agreement had been entered into by them with the respondent No.2 and it was noted that the FIR was based on the allegations of misappropriation though no actual demand had been made by the respondent No.2 and the appellants continued to have rights in their property which allowed the petitioner No.1 to transfer it to his wife without violating the law.

Most remarkably, the Bench then held in para 20 that:
It is clear, therefore, that the facts of each case would determine the exercise of the discretion vested in the court to quash criminal proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of court. As noticed hereinabove, there is no ground to exercise those powers in the present case. It would be open for the accused, being the petitioners, to make their submissions on the material placed before the learned Trial Court to seek discharge, if at all no offence was made out against them.

As a corollary, the Bench then observes in para 21 that:
In the light of these discussions, no merit is found in the petition which is dismissed in limine.

Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing in para 22 that:
The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

In conclusion, the single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Ms Justice Asha Menon of the Delhi High Court has cleared the whole picture in this notable judgment by ruling explicitly, eloquently, elegantly ad effectively. What is subtly clear is that FIR and chargesheet can be quashed if allegations or evidence do not establish the commission of an offence. No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh