It is definitely entirely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Jaspal Singh Kaural vs The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 457 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced as recently as on April 7, 2025 deemed it fit to quash the criminal proceedings in a case that had been registered under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC after noting that the complainant was in a relationship with the accused while being in a subsisting marriage and the physical relationship between the two was consensual from the very beginning.
We need to pay our unremitting attention to the glaring fact that the appellant-accused had petitioned the Supreme Court in which he challenged the impugned order that had been delivered by the Delhi High Court whereby the earlier order of discharging the appellant in a case that had been registered under Sections 376, 506 of the IPC was set aside. To put it differently, we thus see that the top court affirmed what the Sessions Court had ruled discharging the accused as no offence under Sections 375 and 506 IPC was made out. We thus see that the Apex Court while allowing the appeal of appellant deemed it fit to terminate the criminal proceedings against the appellant.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Satish Chandra Sharma for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice BS Nagarathna and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
The Appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved by the Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition no. 1161/2023, whereby the Order dt. 08.06.2023 passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge/Spl. FTC Patiala House Courts, New Delhi [“Ld. Sessions Court”] discharging the Appellant in FIR no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur, U/s 376/506 IPC (“FIR”), was set aside.”
As we see, the Bench then lays bare in para 3 stating that:
The captioned FIR came to be registered at the behest of the Complainant/Respondent no.2, alleging that the Appellant had established physical relations with her, with the promise to marry her, and take care of her two children. The Complaint reveals that the Appellant was known to the prosecutrix since 2011, prior to their respective marriages; however, their love rekindled in 2016, once their matrimonial lives became unsettled.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 4 elucidating that, “It is the case of the Complainant/Respondent no.2 that she was in a relationship with the Appellant since 2016, who was living in Canada at the time, and had come to India, and met her for the first time on 05.02.2017. On that day, he had met the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in his brother’s rental house in Dwarka and established physical relationship with her on the promise that he will marry her after obtaining divorce from his first wife. It is alleged that the Appellant harassed the Complainant into obtaining a divorce from her husband, and had subsequently, also spoken to & assured the first husband, that he would marry the Complainant/Respondent no.2 and take good care of her and her children.”
Delving deeper, the Bench then further unravels in para 5 mentioning that:
The Appellant purportedly lived with the Respondent no. 2 at her house for twenty five days, where he sexually harassed her, and told her that if she refused to establish physical relations with him, he would not marry her. The Complainant has alleged that she obtained divorce from her husband in 2019, on the assurance from the Appellant, that he will marry her; however, on 20.05.2021, the Appellant refused to marry her and even threatened to kill her children. Subsequently thereof, the FIR no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 was registered upon the Complaint filed by the Complainant/Respondent no.2, when the Appellant failed to appear before the Mahila Police Station for counselling and mediation.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 6 observing that:
During the investigation, the Appellant admitted to having physical relations with the Complainant/Respondent no.2, and paying for the mangalsutra with his initials “Jas” on them. The investigation finally culminated into a charge-sheet on 15.05.2022, under Sections 376/506 IPC against the Appellant.”
Further, the Bench discloses in para 7 pointing out that:
The Appellant filed an Application under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short ‘CrPC’) seeking discharge, whereby the Ld. Sessions Court vide Order dt. 08.06.2023, was pleased to discharge the Appellant of the offences under Section 376/506 IPC. It was observed by the Ld. Sessions Court that consent by prosecutrix was very well reasoned and was given after understanding the nature and consequence of sexual indulgence and not out of any misconception of fact.”
Going ahead, the Bench then further reveals in para 8 that:
Aggrieved thereby, the Complainant/Respondent no.2 filed a Criminal Revision Petition no. 1161/2023 before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, which was allowed vide Impugned Judgment dt. 03.01.2024. Vide the Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024, the High Court whilst assailing the order on discharge, made specific observations holding that there is prima-facie material to establish that the Appellant had indulged in sexual relationship with the Complainant/Respondent, with the promise to marry her, and frame charges against the Appellant, for offences under U/s 376/506 IPC in FIR no. 281/2021. The Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024 is under challenge before this Court.”
Briefly stated, the Bench notes in para 13 that:
At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim Ahmed Vs State (NCT) of Delhi [2023] 15 SCC 385 whereby this Hon’ble Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the accused/Appellant, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such relationship with the accused Appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the complaint.”
The key point of this notable judgment is stated in para 22 of Nain (supra) case that:
Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC.”
Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 14 that:
The decision in Naim Ahmed (supra) is squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It has been time and again settled by this Hon’ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. (Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471).”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 15 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that:
Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the following facts are clearly established:
- The physical relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent no. 2 was consensual from the very beginning and cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material on record to show that there was any dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the Appellant.
- There is also no material on record, to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under section 506 IPC against the Appellant. In-fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the Appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the Appellant had made a promise to marry the Respondent no.2 and was acting accordingly. The Mangalsutra being prepared with the initials of the name of the Complainant/Respondent no.2 does reflect his intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a fall-out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct dishonest.
- There is also no element of criminality that can be accrued to the Appellant, insofar as it is the own case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with the Appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage. It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period of five years (Prashant Vs State of NCT Delhi 2024 SCC Online SC 3375), while being in a subsisting marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the relationship. The prolonged period of the relationship, during which the sexual relations continued between the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship. (Mahesh Damu Khare Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr. [2024] SCC Online SC 3471). The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation. (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of Maharashtra [2019] 9 SCC 608).”
It is worth noting that the Bench as a corollary then notes in para 16 that:
In view of the aforesaid, we find that there was sufficient material on record for the Ld. Sessions Court to exercise powers under section 227 CrPC, and discharge the Appellant. It is trite law that at the time of framing of charge, a mini trial is not permissible (State of Rajasthan vs Ashok Kumar Kashyap [2021] SCC Online SC 314) and the Trial Court has to proceed with the material brought on record by the prosecution and determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. (State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan And Others (2014) 11 SCC 709). A bare review of the FIR and the charge-sheet and material placed on record by the prosecution, would clarify that the ingredients of offences under Section 375/506 IPC are not established.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench points out in para 17 holding that:
We also find that the High Court has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Chargesheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record. It is trite law that the scope of interference and exercise of revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and should be exercised very sparingly, specifically in instances, where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, or there is noncompliance of the provisions of law, or the finding recorded by the trial court is based on no evidence, or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely by framing the charge. This is certainly not the case in the present matter insofar as the findings of the Ld. Sessions Court are based on the material on record.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs in para 18 holding that:
For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 03.01.2024 and uphold the Order dt. 08.06.2023 passed by the Sessions Court. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to terminate the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR bearing no. 281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur, U/s 376/506 IPC against the Appellant.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 19 that:
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.”
In conclusion, there can be just no gainsaying that it is high time and lawmakers must now definitely amend the rape laws and if a woman has sex with a men without force being used then it should not be termed rape! Why should a woman get ready to have sex with men without marriage and only on promise of marriage surrender her body and later cry rape? This definitely merits prompt changes so that a woman whether married or unmarried stops having sex with men on any pretext whatsoever without marriage being consummated so that it acts as a strong deterrent to woman not to have sex with any men on any pretext whatsoever and also go a long way in checking misuse of rape laws against men by woman who for years has sex with men enjoying and later suddenly cry rape waking up after a long time and forwards promise of marriage as most favourite excuse for surrendering her body to him!
It merits just no reiteration that the earlier this is done, the better it shall be! This will definitely usher in morality and women will think thousands times before having sex with men without consummation of marriage and will definitely go a long way in nipping in the bud the most regressive practice of women surrendering her body on pretext of marriage for years and later terming it as rape! It definitely brooks no more delay anymore longer now!
In addition, if a woman files false complaints of rape then she must be jailed for at least few years and also made to pay huge compensation to men so that it acts as a strong deterrent against the growing nefarious tendency of exploiting women safety laws as potent dangerous tools to harass, humiliate and harangue men and extort huge money from them and if they don’t comply then make them suffer huge imprisonment in jail for just no fault of theirs! The buck must stop now on this count! It is definitely most deeply disappointing that even in new revised penal laws we see no such changes having been made but still these much desired compelling changes can be incorporated in new revised penal laws also if Parliament and law makers collectively take action on this count at the earliest! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh
