It definitely has to be paid singular attention that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand of Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Suresh Kumar vs Union of India & Ors in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11054/2008 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: [2025:RJ-JP:6012] and cited in 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 67 that was pronounced as recently as on 11/02/2025 has minced just no words to say in no uncertain terms that right to be forgotten for a juvenile by way of destroying records of juvenile delinquency is an absolute right and has to be given full meaning by the State. It must be noted that the Bench made it amply clear that such a disclosure of juvenile delinquency would defeat the purpose of the legislation by adversely impacting the rehabilitation as well as the socio-economic stability of the juvenile pushing him/her again towards criminal delinquency. It was also made crystal clear by the Bench that even when police verification was conducted with respect to the petitioner, the police officials should have refrained from revealing such information and failing to do so was a gross violation of confidentiality and mandatory provisions of law. Accordingly, we thus see that all this culminated in the petition being very rightly allowed by the Bench and the State was directed to reinstate the petitioner back in service. Absolutely right!

Before stating anything else, we see that in the fitness of things, the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand of Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court in this notable judgment lays the groundwork by propounding that:
For the welfare of a child, the burden of past mistakes must be lifted, offering him a fresh start to thrive, free from the weight of stigma. As Nelson Mandela once said, There is nothing like returning to a place that remains unchanged to find the ways in which you yourself have altered.

The children deserve the chance to evolve and grow beyond their past, shaped not by previous errors but by their potential for the future. The shadows of past transgressions should be expunged, granting them the opportunity to lead a life unburdened by stigma and brimming with possibility.

Albert Einstein also reminded us, ‘It is not that I’m so smart, but I stay with the questions much longer.’ In the same way, children should be given the time and space to transform, with their future defining them, not their history. By fostering their growth, we allow them the freedom to rise above their past and realize the promise of tomorrow.

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
By way of filing this petition, a challenge has been made to the impugned order dated 06.05.2008 by which the services of the petitioner have been terminated on the ground that he has concealed about his involvement and conviction in a criminal case.

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the facts of the case stating that:
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was granted appointment on the post of Constable. Counsel submits that the petitioner was a juvenile when a criminal case was registered against him, and he was tried by the Juvenile Justice Board for the said case whereby, he was found guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 436, 457 & 380 I.P.C. Counsel submits that no sentence was awarded to the petitioner, but he was released on admonition, after his counselling, vide judgment dated 16.11.2004. Counsel submits that the aforesaid judgment could not lead to any disqualification for the petitioner in getting any public employment as he was a juvenile at the time of committing the offence and during trial. Counsel submits that under this belief, he applied and did not disclose this fact in the application form for getting appointment on the post of Constable.

Do note, the Bench notes in para 24 that:
Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, speaks of ‘removal of disqualification attaching to conviction’, but the language employed in Section 24 of the Act of 2015 is not only for excluding or erasing the criminal antecedent record, but goes a step forward, by laying down a provision that the criminal antecedent record of a juvenile be erased/destroyed completely, so that such previous conviction or criminal delinquency of a juvenile would not be carried forward, so as to prevent any adverse impact of his previous delinquency, upon his future prospects.

In the fitness of things, we see that the Bench very rightly points out in para 25 that:
Now adverting to the facts of the present case in the above perspective, non-furnishing of the information by the petitioner regarding his juvenile delinquency and conviction, has to be accepted as a valid excuse under law and such previous negativity of the past/the previous criminal delinquency, cannot be permitted to be used to the detriment of the incumbent like the present petitioner, with a view to oust him from the recruitment exercise as involved herein, thereby adversely impacting the career prospects of the petitioner, despite having been extended the benefit of Section 24 of the Act of 2015.

As we see, the Bench then further points out in para 26 that:
This Court further observes that in the present case once in view of the clear legislative intention behind Section 24 of the Act of 2015 as above, the learned JJB though has convicted the petitioner for the offence, but has ordered that the same shall not be treated as a disqualification in regard to any future prospect of the petitioner and also ordered that the complete record of the conviction shall be destroyed, then conviction of the present petitioner, in light of the prescriptions of Section 24 of the Act of 2015, cannot be treated as a bar for entitling the petitioner for any recruitment or other future prospects, including the one involved in this case.

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 27 that:
This Court also observes that the petitioner is a meritorious candidate and passed the various stages of the recruitment process for the post in question, and once the competent Court, which conducted the trial of the criminal case, while recording a clear finding invoking Section 19 of the Act of 2000 that the said conviction order does not affect the future prospects of the petitioner in no manner, and therefore, the impugned order declaring the petitioner as disqualified/ineligible for the post in question on count of the conviction in the criminal case in question, cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench points out in para 28 that:
This Court thus holds that once the benefit of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 was extended to the petitioner, who at the relevant time, was a juvenile, then in that case, even if the information of the conviction in question was not furnished by the petitioner, during the recruitment process, the same cannot be termed as ‘concealment’ on his part, as the very erasure/destroying of the conviction record, as ordered by the learned JJB, while convicting the petitioner and extending him the aforesaid benefit of the legal provision, was to prevent any adverse impact of such conviction on the future prospects of the petitioner.

It also cannot be glossed over that the Bench then further specifies in para 29 stating that:
This Court further holds that the ‘right to be forgotten’, regarding a Juvenile, where Section 24 of the Act of 2015, shall remain a definite right and a juvenile, who has been given the benefit of Section 24 shall be entitled for erasure of his juvenile delinquency by not putting it on record anywhere, because creation or perpetuation of such record, may highlight a kind of embarrassment to the juvenile, which in turn, would certainly have an adverse impact on his future prospects, which includes a selection process for public employment, and goes against the legislative intention of juvenile laws.

Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 30 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that:
This Court directs that the ‘right to be forgotten’ for juvenile by removal/destroying of the record of juvenile delinquency is an absolute right, and therefore, to give it a full meaning, the State as well as other Bodies, falling under the definition of ‘State’ as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, are hereby lawfully restrained from seeking any information, in future, from the then juvenile about the previous record/information of his juvenile delinquency, in cases where the benefit of Section 24 of the Act of 2015 has been extended, so as to prevent any adverse impact of such delinquency on the future prospects of the juvenile.

Most forthrightly and no less significant is what is then laid bare in para 31 propounding that:
Looking to the mandatory provisions contained under Section 19(2) of the Act of 2000 and Section 24 of the Act of 2015, this Court finds no substance in the arguments of the respondents that the petitioner was under an obligation to disclose the information with regard to lodging of criminal case against him and his admonition in the said case with respect to an incident which had taken place, when he a minor of the age of 15 years and disclosing of such information would run contrary to the spirit of the Act of 2000.

Keeping in mind that no stigma is attached to a juvenile in conflict with law, in the considered view of this Court, when once the juvenile has been extended a protective umbrella under the above enactment, then there was no good reason available for the respondents to have insisted that the petitioner ought to have disclosed the information relating to the allegations against him, pertaining to an offence that was committed during his minority, where he was tried as a juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board.

It is also note-worthy to mention here that even when the police verification with respect to the petitioner was conducted, the concerned police officials ought to have refrained from revealing the information, pertaining to case of the petitioner, since he was juvenile at the relevant time. This was prima facie gross breach of confidentiality and violation of the mandatory provisions contained under the Act.

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 32 that:
Considering the above judgments passed by the Delhi High Court in the cases of Pradeep Hooda (supra), Mukesh Yadav (supra) and Jorawer Singh Mundy (supra) the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Bishnoi (supra), this Court finds no valid reason to take a different view against the petitioner who also was a juvenile, when the alleged incident took place.

It is worth noting that the Bench then notes in para 33 that:
Considering the fact that the conviction of the petitioner, would not attach any disqualification in pursuance of Section 19(1) & (2) of the Act of 2000, the order impugned order dated 06.05.2008 passed by the respondents is not sustainable and accordingly, the same is quashed and set-aside.

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 34 noting and directing that:
The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner back in service with all consequential benefits. It goes without saying that the respondents would do the needful exercise within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

Finally, we see that the Bench then concludes by holding in para 35 that:
All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh