It is definitely most refreshing, most reassuring and so also most reinvigorating to learn that the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Madhushree Datta vs The State of Karnataka & Anr in Criminal Appeal No. 4884 of 2024 [arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 10082/2019] with Criminal Appeal No. 4883 of 2024 [arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 10115/2019] and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 105 and so also in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 108 that was pronounced most recently on January 24, 2025 has quashed a workplace harassment case that had been filed by a female employee against her colleagues mincing absolutely just no words to observe that the allegations arose from employment disputes that had been exaggerated into a criminal matter.
It is of immense significance to note that the top court noted while taking into account the irrefutable fact that the proceedings against the appellants were a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant.
What also must be borne in mind is that the Apex Court Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra was hearing the case where the complainant alleged that the appellants had forcibly demanded her resignation under the threat of dismissal, confiscated her belongings and physically and verbally harassed her. She also claimed that her intellectual property stored on the company’s laptop was unlawfully seized.
We must note that the criminal complaint was filed by the female employee against the appellants for offences under various Sections of the IPC. The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings on the appeal filed by the appellants. While striking down the Karnataka High Court judgment, we see that the Apex Court noted that:
The criminal proceedings were initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a settlement. It was thus entirely in the fitness of things that the Apex Court accordingly allowed the appeal and so also most commendably quashed the pending criminal case that had been lodged maliciously with mala fide intentions to wreak vengeance, cause harm or coerce settlement against the appellants as conceded in this brilliant judgment itself. No denying or disputing it!
At the very outset, this rational, robust, remarkable and recent judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
By a common impugned judgment and order dated 31st July, 2019 (impugned order), a learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka (High Court) dismissed Criminal Petition No. 3961 of 2015 (Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal Petition No. 3962 of 2015 (Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.), both filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC), seeking quashing of the chargesheet filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore (ACMM).
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 2 that:
The accused appellants - Madhushree Datta (first accused) and Badrinarayana Jaganathan (second accused) - have taken exception to the impugned order by presenting these appeals.
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of the case that:
The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of 25th October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant lodged a complaint dated 26th October, 2013 with the Sub-Inspector of Police, H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli, Bangalore, against M/s Juniper Networks India Private Limited Company and the appellants. The complainant asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at the Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by the management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply.
Specifically, the complainant alleged that on October 25, 2013, between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the first accused, who held the position of Human Resources Manager at the Company, demanded that the complainant resign under threat of immediate dismissal. Furthermore, the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant not to return to work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et cetera. The complainant further asserted that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant alleged that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening with dire consequences.
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 disclosing that:
Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) was registered on 26th October, 2013. The NCR states that the employees of the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to both mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop, which contained her data. The complainant subsequently filed a formal complaint seeking an inquiry and investigation into the matter, following her forcible termination from employment on October 25, 2013.
Further, the Bench then discloses in para 5 stating that:
More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged by the complainant accusing the Company and the appellants of having committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The FIR states that the Company, along with the first accused, subjected the complainant to both physical and mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the laptop issued to the complainant and forcibly evicted her from the Company.
Furthermore, the Bench reveals in para 6 mentioning that:
Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23rd April 2014, arraigning the appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the appellants physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in filthy language and forcibly terminating her employment. Furthermore, with the assistance of security personnel, the appellants are said to have had the complainant removed from the premises of the Company.
Of course, the Bench then lays bare in para 7 stating that:
Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the High Court as noted above.
What’s more, the Bench points out in para 8 that:
A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily considered the allegations set forth in the complainant’s complaint and concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements to constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court rejected the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed by the police in registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that the materials on record suggest that the offences alleged against the appellants involve both cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The High Court further held that a mere lapse in the process of investigation, by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for quashing the proceedings.
Moreover, the records indicate that the investigating officer had obtained the requisite authorization under Section 155(2) of the Cr. PC prior to registration of the FIR. Additionally, the High Court noted that the alleged offences were committed by employees of the Company, that is, the appellants, and not by the Company itself, without the Company’s consent. Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as an accused in the chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek quashing of the chargesheet.
It is worth noting that the Bench stipulates in para 12 that:
The points for determination that emerge for decision are:
- Whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie, ingredients of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety?
- Whether the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?
Do note, the Bench notes in para 17 that:
Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused.
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 18 that:
Furthermore, the chargesheet reiterates the similar version set forth in the complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown out of the office by the security personnel. While the actions of the security personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they are neither named in the complaint nor figure as accused in the chargesheet. Having said that, the appellants cannot be said to have foreseen or anticipated the actions of the security personnel in such a manner that would render them co-perpetrators of the offence. Hence, there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth the concept of liability of the employer or for the overt acts of its employees in this matter.
Resultantly, the Bench holds in para 19 that:
In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the chargesheet.
It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench notably points out in para 31 that, To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using filthy language. Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.
Quite significantly, the Bench propounds in para 40 holding that:
To sum up, after the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered. It indicated that no cognizable offence was initially believed to have been committed against the complainant. Subsequently, an FIR was lodged on 23rd December, 2012, i.e., 58 (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was filed, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. It is pertinent to note that only Section 509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are non-cognizable offences. Furthermore, the FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge under Section 509 of the IPC.
Additionally, the chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of filthy language by the appellants in scolding the complainant. The discrepancies and variations outlined above, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant.
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 41 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that:
Notwithstanding this, and as asserted by the appellants, there are certain facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a settlement. The presence of the second accused cannot by any stretch of imagination be visualised, if one were to barely read the complaints - initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as true; yet, the complainant alleged acts against him which, according to her, amounted to criminal offence. We are reminded of the maxim res ipsa loquitur and leave the discussion at that.
Most forthrightly, the Bench holds in para 42 that:
The legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. PC for quashing complaints and criminal proceedings have been formulated by this Court in a plethora of decisions. We see no reason to burden this judgment of ours by referring to the same. However, we are fully convinced that allowing the criminal proceedings to proceed against the appellants would amount to an abuse of the legal process and result in a travesty of justice.
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 43 that:
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are also of the view that the arguments advanced by Mr. Luthra on the permissibility of the police to register the FIR on 23rd December, 2013 need not be examined in this appeal.
It must be noted that the Bench notes in para 44 that:
We, therefore, answer point (i), referred to in paragraph 12 (supra) in the negative while point (ii) of the same paragraph is answered in the affirmative.
It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 45 that:
Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court, dated 31.07.2019, cannot be sustained and, consequently, stands set aside. The chargesheet and the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the ACCM, Bangalore, against the appellants also stand quashed.
Finally and for sake of clarity, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 47 that:
We, however, make it clear that the findings/observations recorded/made herein shall have no bearing on the pending reference between the parties before the Labour Court.
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh
