While setting aside the order of the Calcutta High Court which vacated a stay order in violation of an order concerning possession of suit premises amounting to civil contempt, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Amit Kumar Das vs Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust in Civil Appeal No. …………... of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 34892 of 2014 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024 INSC 73 that was pronounced as recently as on January 30, 2024 in the exercise of its civil appellate jurisdiction has minced just no words to make it indubitably clear that courts can issue appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying things done in violation of its order. This must be implemented in letter and spirit.

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kumar for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Aniruddha Bose and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
Focus in this appeal is on the scope and extent of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 that:
By judgment dated 12.11.2014 passed in C.P.A.N. 2113 of 2013 in F.A. No. 229 of 2010, a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta held that the act of the contemnor therein was in willful disobedience to the stay order passed in the first appeal and was not only contemptuous but also illegal and invalid. However, instead of initiating proceedings for contempt, the Division Bench opined that justice would be subserved by vacating the stay order passed in the first appeal. Aggrieved by this turn of events, the contemnor is before this Court.

As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 4 that:
By order dated 27.01.2015, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court at Calcutta.

While elaborating on the facts of the case, the Bench enunciates in para 5 that, Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, Kolkata (for brevity, ‘the Trust’), was the plaintiff in T. Suit No. 164 of 2004, filed for declaration of title, recovery of possession and for damages, before the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore. This suit was instituted by it against Baitanik, a registered society (for brevity, ‘the Society), which was in occupation of the premises, detailed in suit schedules A and B, situated at 4B, Elgin Road (now, Lala Lajpat Rai Sarani), Bhawanipore, Kolkata. The Trial Court decreed the suit by its judgment dated 25.02.2009 and directed delivery of possession of the suit premises to the Trust within 30 days. Execution proceedings were initiated by the Trust on 30.07.2009.

On the one hand, the Bench mentions in para 11 that:
The appellant before us, viz., the contemnor, would contend that it was not open to the High Court to vacate the stay order passed in the appeal in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. He would point out that no steps were taken by the Trust to seek such relief in the appeal and the High Court ought not to have resorted to such action in the contempt case.

On the other hand, the Bench observes in para 12 that:
On the contrary, the Trust would argue that the impugned order does not warrant interference at this stage as the order of stay dated 03.03.2010 in the appeal stood vacated automatically in terms of clause 7 thereof, as there was a default in the making of deposits as directed in the earlier clauses. It would point out that the Society was required to deposit a sum of 10 lakh with the Registrar General of the High Court within the ₹ stipulated time but such deposit was made only on 22.12.2010, well after the expiry thereof.

It would also point out that the Society was required to deposit occupation charges @ 35,000/- per month during the pendency of the appeal and assert that the Society stopped making such deposits since February, 2020. It is however admitted by the Trust that no steps were taken to revive the execution proceedings on these grounds.

Most significantly, the Bench while citing the relevant case law propounds in para 14 that:
However, in Baranagore Jute Factory PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) vs. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC. (2017) 5 SCC 506, considering the aforestated precedent, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the 3-Judge Bench had clarified therein that directions which are explicit in the judgment or ‘are plainly self-evident’ can be taken into account for the purpose of considering whether there is any disobedience or willful violation. The Bench further held that the Court has a duty to issue appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying the things done in violation of the Court order and in that regard, the Court may even take restitutive measures at any stage of the proceedings.

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 15 that:
Significantly, the 2-Judge Bench had merely echoed the affirmation of the legal position by another 2-Judge Bench of this Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 622. The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt was reiterated therein.

Reference was made by the Bench to Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir Babuji (1984) 4 SCC 216, wherein it was held that undergoing punishment for contempt would not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. Therefore, the principle that stands crystallized by these judgments is that, in addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely suffering the punishment meted out to him.

Most forthrightly, the Bench mandates in para 16 that:
This being the settled legal position, we find that the fact situation in the present case is such, that vacating of the stay order in the appeal by the High Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction did not assume either a restitutive or a remedying character.

Violation of the status quo condition in the stay order stood complete, even as per the High Court, and vacating of the stay order did not have the effect of restoring the parties to their original position or deny the contemnor the benefit of the disobedience which already stood concluded. Violation of a conditional stay order, in the usual course, would entail vacating thereof in a properly constituted proceeding. By resorting to such a step while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the High Court, in our considered opinion was not acting in furtherance of the principle adumbrated in the above decisions.

Most sagaciously, the Bench then further expounds in para 17 that:
No doubt, the concluded act in violation of the status quo order in relation to possession of the suit premises amounted to ‘civil contempt’ under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and warranted appropriate consequences under the provisions thereof. However, without taking recourse to such a step, the High Court thought it fit to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to enable the Trust to execute the decree. This action of the High Court clearly transgressed the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.

To that extent, the impugned order is set aside. However, as the High Court desisted from exercising contempt jurisdiction, owing to this misconceived measure, despite finding the contemnor guilty of willfully violating the status quo condition in the stay order, we consider it appropriate to remand the matter to the High Court for continuing with that exercise as we have now set aside the course of action adopted by the High Court in the alternative.

In addition, the Bench then further directs in para 18 that:
Further, as the Trust asserts that the stay order stood vacated automatically owing to the default by the Society in making deposits, it is for the Trust to take appropriate steps. The Trust would be at liberty to take all such measures as are permissible in law in that regard, be it before the High Court or the executing Court.

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 19 that:
The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, to the extent indicated above. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.

In sum, we thus see that the Apex Court partly allows the appeal. While citing the most relevant case laws, the top court also makes it crystal clear that the courts can certainly issue appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying things done in violation of its order. Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi,A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh