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Saturday, November 23, 2024

ED Can’t Be Vindictive, Grounds Of Arrest Must Be Furnished In Writing To Accused At The Time Of Arrest: SC

Posted in: Criminal Law
Wed, Oct 4, 23, 20:41, 1 Year ago
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Pankaj Bansal vs UOI that the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) should furnish the grounds of arrest to the accused in writing at the time of arrest.

In one of the most significant judgment pronounced in recent times, it would be of immense significance to note that the Apex Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Pankaj Bansal vs Union of India & Ors in Criminal Appeal Nos 3051-3052 of 2023 {@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9220-21 of 2023} and cited in Neutral Citation: 2023INSC866 and also cited in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 844 that was pronounced as recently as on October 3, 2023 held in no uncertain terms that the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) should furnish the grounds of arrest to the accused in writing at the time of arrest. We thus see that the top court came down raining heavily on the central agency for its arbitrary approach taken in the instant case by which the grounds of arrest were not furnished to the accused in written form. While taking a serious note of the unpalatable truth that the ED officer merely read out the grounds of arrest, the Court held that such a conduct will not fulfill the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. It must be noted that the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice AS Bopanna and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kumar while setting aside the arrest of Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal in the money laundering case against the real estate group M3M clearly maintained that:
We hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kumar for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice AS Bopanna and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
Challenge in these appeals is to the orders dated 20.07.2023 and 26.07.2023 passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissing CWP No. 14536 of 2023 filed by Pankaj Bansal and CWP No. 14539 of 2023 filed by his father, Basant Bansal. By the order dated 20.07.2023, the Division Bench opined that, as the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 2002’), had been upheld by the Supreme Court, the challenge to the same by the writ petitioners could not be considered only because of the fact that a review petition was pending before the Supreme Court. The prayer of the writ petitioners to that effect was accordingly rejected. By the later order dated 26.07.2023, the Division Bench rejected the prayer of the writ petitioners to quash/set aside their arrest orders along with their arrest memos and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including the orders dated 15.06.2023, 20.06.2023 and 26.06.2023 passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, whereby they were remanded to the custody of the Directorate of Enforcement (for brevity, ‘the ED’) and thereafter, to judicial custody. The Division Bench further held that, keeping in view the gravity of the allegations against them, their prayer to be released from custody did not deserve acceptance and rejected the same. In consequence, the Division Bench dismissed both the writ petitions. Hence, these appeals by Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal.

To recapitulate, the Bench lays bare in para 3 that:
The genesis of these appeals is traceable to FIR No. 0006 dated 17.04.2023 registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Panchkula, Haryana, under Sections 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 120B IPC for the offences of corruption and bribery along with criminal conspiracy. The names of the accused in this FIR are:

 

  1. Mr. Sudhir Parmar (the then Special Judge, CBI and ED, Panchkula)
  2. Mr. Ajay Parmar (nephew of Mr. Sudhir Parmar and Deputy Manager (Legal) in M3M Group);
  3. Mr. Roop Bansal (Promotor of M3M Group); and
  4. other unknown persons.


To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 4 that, Significantly, prior to this FIR, between the years 2018 and 2020, 13 FIRs were gotten registered by allottees of two residential projects of the IREO Group, alleging illegalities on the part of its management. On the strength of these FIRs, the ED recorded Enforcement Case Information Report No. GNZO/10/2021 dated 15.06.2021 (hereinafter, ‘the first ECIR’) in connection with the money laundering offences allegedly committed by the IREO Group and Lalit Goyal, its Vice-Chairman and Managing Director. Neither in the FIRs nor in the first ECIR were M3M Group or the appellants herein arrayed as the accused. Further, no allegations were levelled against them therein. On 14.01.2022, the ED filed Prosecution Complaint No. 01/2022, titled ‘Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement vs. Lalit Goyal and others’, against seven named accused, under Section 200 Cr.P.C read with Sections 44 and 45 of the Act of 2002. Notably, M3M Group and the appellants did not figure amongst those named accused. The number of FIRs had also increased from 13 to 30, as per this complaint.

This case was numbered as COMA/01/2022, titled ‘Directorate of Enforcement vs. Lalit Goyal and others’, and was pending in the Court of Sudhir Parmar, Special Judge. At that stage, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Panchkula, received information that Sudhir Parmar was showing favouritism to Lalit Goyal, the owner of IREO Group, and also to Roop Bansal and his brother, Basant Bansal, the owners of M3M Group. This led to the registration of FIR No. 0006 dated 17.04.2023. On 12.05.2023, the ED issued summons to M3M India Pvt. Ltd., calling upon it to provide information and documents pertaining to transactions with certain companies. Thereafter, on 01.06.2023, the ED raided the properties of M3M Group and effected seizures of assets and bank accounts. Roop Bansal was arrested by the ED on 08.06.2023 apropos the first ECIR.

As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 5 that:
Apprehending that action would be taken against them also in the context of the first ECIR, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal secured interim protection from the Delhi High Court in Bail Application Nos. 2030 and 2031 of 2023. By separate orders dated 09.06.2023 passed therein, the Delhi High Court noted that Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal had not been named in the first ECIR and that the ED had not yet been able to implicate them in any of the scheduled offences under the Act of 2002. Further, the High Court noted that Pankaj Bansal had not even been summoned by the ED in that case. The High Court accordingly granted them interim protection by way of anticipatory bail, subject to conditions, till the next date of hearing, i.e., 05.07.2023. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 7384 and 7396 of 2023 were filed by the ED assailing the orders dated 09.06.2023 before this Court and the same are stated to be pending.

Do note, the Bench notes in para 25 that:
We may also note that the failure of the appellants to respond to the questions put to them by the ED would not be sufficient in itself for the Investigating Officer to opine that they were liable to be arrested under Section 19, as that provision specifically requires him to find reason to believe that they were guilty of an offence under the Act of 2002. Mere non-cooperation of a witness in response to the summons issued under Section 50 of the Act of 2002 would not be enough to render him/her liable to be arrested under Section 19. As per its replies, it is the claim of the ED that Pankaj Bansal was evasive in providing relevant information. It was however not brought out as to why Pankaj Bansal’s replies were categorized as ‘evasive’ and that record is not placed before us for verification. In any event, it is not open to the ED to expect an admission of guilt from the person summoned for interrogation and assert that anything short of such admission would be an ‘evasive reply’. In Santosh S/o Dwarkadas Fafat vs. State of Maharashtra8 , this Court noted that custodial interrogation is not for the purpose of ‘confession’ as the right against self-incrimination is provided by Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It was held that merely because an accused did not confess, it cannot be said that he was not co-operating with the investigation. Similarly, the absence of either or both of the appellants during the search operations, when their presence was not insisted upon, cannot be held against them.

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 26 that:
The more important issue presently is as to how the ED is required to ‘inform’ the arrested person of the grounds for his/her arrest. Prayer (iii) in the writ petitions filed by the appellants pertained to this. Section 19 does not specify in clear terms as to how the arrested person is to be ‘informed’ of the grounds of arrest and this aspect has not been dealt with or delineated in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Similarly, in V. Senthil Balaji (supra), this Court merely noted that the information of the grounds of arrest should be ‘served’ on the arrestee, but did not elaborate on that issue. Pertinent to note, the grounds of arrest were furnished in writing to the arrested person in that case. Surprisingly, no consistent and uniform practice seems to be followed by the ED in this regard, as written copies of the grounds of arrest are furnished to arrested persons in certain parts of the country but in other areas, that practice is not followed and the grounds of arrest are either read out to them or allowed to be read by them.

Most remarkably, the Bench postulates in para 29 that:
In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 of the Act of 2002 enables the person arrested under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the Court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the authorized officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the officer’s ‘reason to believe’ that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of 2002. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this higher purpose and must be given due importance.

Most significantly, the Bench mandates in para 35 that:
On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that the ED’s Investigating Officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, we have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of the ED in proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of the ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.

Finally, the Bench concludes by holding in para 36 that:
The appeals are accordingly allowed, setting aside the impugned orders passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as well as the impugned arrest orders and arrest memos along with the orders of remand passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, and all orders consequential thereto. The appellants shall be released forthwith unless their incarceration is validly required in connection with any other case. In the circumstances, we make no orders as to costs.

In essence, the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear that ED must not cross the Laxman Rekha in violating the legal rights of the accused. It also was most forthright in making it crystal clear that ED can’t be vindictive in its actions. The top court also mandated that the ED must furnish the grounds of arrest in writing to the accused at the time of arrest. No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

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