While clearing the air on quashing of the criminal proceedings, the Apex Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs State of UP & Ors in SLP(Crl.) 39 of 2022 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993 that was pronounced finally on November 28, 2022 observed explicitly that the criminal proceedings can be quashed when the complaint on the basis of which FIR was registered does not disclose any acts of the accused or their participation in the commission of crime. In this case, an FIR was lodged against the accused and a charge sheet was filed under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 448, 387 IPC. They approached the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the FIR/Charge Sheet. As the High Court dismissed it, they approached the Apex Court.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ajay Rastogi for a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice CT Ravi Kumar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
The instant appeals have been filed against the judgment dated 3rd February, 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the criminal miscellaneous application filed at the instance of the present appellants.
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 that:
The dispute relates to House No.189, Mohalla Madia, Kanpur Road, Jhansi, which as per the complainant, was purchased in the name of Shravan Kumar Gupta, who was minor at that time, by means of a registered sale deed dated 4th May, 1977 and through the ostensible owner, the de-facto complainant purchased the property by registered sale deed dated 22nd December, 2018, but prior thereto, a family settlement took place in the family comprising of Ram Kumari, widow of Raja Ram Gupta and her four sons, namely, Ramesh Chandra Gupta, Ashok Kumar, Shravan Kumar and Vinod Kumar and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed between the parties on 19th August, 2006 and in terms of the aforesaid MOU, the house came in the share of Vinod Kumar Gupta and while the Original Suit No.91 of 2015 filed at the instance of Vinod Kumar Gupta was pending adjudication, the ostensible owner Shravan Kumar Gupta executed a registered sale deed dated 22nd December, 2018 in favour of the de-facto complainant and according to the informant/second respondent, who is the vendee of the aforementioned registered sale deed, possession by title in favour of Shravan Kumar Gupta over the house in dispute came to be transferred in his favour and possession of the same was also handed over to him(de-facto complainant).
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 4 that:
The de-facto complainant/second respondent, Atul Shukla, had a grievance that he was dispossessed from the subject property in question in reference to which a complaint dated 29th January, 2019 was made under Section 156(3) CrPC with the concerned Magistrate. As a consequence of the aforesaid, an FIR dated 2nd April, 2019 came to be registered as Case Crime No.183 of 2019 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 IPC, P.S. Navabad, District Jhansi. In the aforesaid FIR, four persons were specifically named, viz. Vinod Kumar Gupta, Ashish Gupta, Ramesh Chandra Gupta and Rinky Sarna.
Simply put, the Bench then discloses in para 11 that:
The pith and substance of the complaint of the de-facto complainant/second respondent is that the subject property was sold by the ostensible owner, Shravan Kumar Gupta, in reference to which registered sale deed was executed in his favour on 22nd December, 2018, but he was later dispossessed from the subject property.
As it turned out, the Bench then observed in para 12 that:
Subsequent to the aforesaid FIR, the investigating officer conducted investigation and later submitted a charge-sheet dated 24th June, 2019, whereby named accused i.e. the appellants herein have been charge-sheeted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 448, 387 IPC. Upon submission of the above charge-sheet, the learned CJM, Jhansi, by an order dated 13th August, 2019 took cognizance and summoned the present accused appellants.
Quite ostensibly, the Bench then reveals in para 13 that:
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the appellants who were charge-sheeted, approached the High Court by filing a Miscellaneous Application under Section 482 CrPC. That came to be dismissed by the High Court under the judgment impugned dated 3rd February, 2021 which is the subject matter of challenge in appeals before us.
Furthermore, the Bench then states in para 14 that:
The High Court under the impugned judgment has even failed to examine as to what was the complaint and how the present appellants are, in any manner, concerned with the so-called alleged commission of crime, but after recording superficial observations regarding the scope of interference under Section 482 CrPC dismissed the petition under the order impugned.
Quite significantly, the Bench then enunciates in para 16 that:
The exposition of law on the subject relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. This Court has held in para 102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
- Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
- Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
- Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
- Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
- Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
- Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
- Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
Quite pertinently, the Bench then mentions in para 17 that:
The principles culled out by this Court have consistently been followed in the recent judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315.
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then mandates in para 18 that:
The present case is fully covered by categories (1) and (3), as enumerated in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others (supra). A bare perusal of the complaint on the basis of which FIR came to be registered at the instance of the de-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime.
They are neither concerned with the registered sale deed dated 4th May, 1977 nor the later sale deed executed in favour of the de-facto complainant by Shravan Kumar Gupta dated 22nd December, 2018, nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question.
Quite palpably, the Bench then propounds in para 19 that:
What it appears is that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute which is pending between Vinod Kumar Gupta, Shravan Kumar Gupta and the de-facto complainant in Original Suit No.91 of 2015.
Most notably, the Bench then holds in para 20 that:
We are of the view that in the present facts and circumstances, the High Court ought to have exercised its power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants.
Furthermore, the Bench observes in para 21 that:
Before parting with the order, we further like to observe that the observations which has been made are restricted to the three appellants, namely, Ramesh Chandra Gupta, Ashish Gupta and Rinky Sarna before this Court and the learned trial Judge may not be influenced by the observations made above and may proceed with the Criminal Case No.2200 of 2019 qua the other accused persons independently on its own merits in accordance with law.
What’s more, the Bench then hastens to add in para 22 that:
Needless to say that the Court which is seized of the Original Suit No.91 of 2015 may decide the same independently on its own merits in accordance with law.
Going forward, the Bench then holds in para 23 that:
In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment impugned of the High Court dated 3rd February, 2021 is set aside and FIR numbered as Criminal Case No.2200 of 2019 registered at PS Navabad, District Jhansi and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 24 that:
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Supreme Court has made it indubitably clear that the criminal proceedings can be quashed when complaint/FIR does not disclose any act/participation of accused in crime. It thus merits no reiteration that all the High Courts and District Courts must not only pay heed to what has been laid down by the Apex Court in this noteworthy case but also strictly abide by it! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh
