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Tuesday, November 5, 2024

2006 Meerut Fire Tragedy : SC Fixes Liability 40:60 Liability On State & Organizers To Compensate Victims

Posted in: Consumer Law
Wed, Apr 13, 22, 20:45, 3 Years ago
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Sanjay Gupta Vs. Uttar Pradesh to work on a day to day basis for determining the compensation payable to the families of the victims of the fire that broke out during a consumer fair in Meerut in 2006.

In a much awaited decision, the Supreme Court finally as recently as on April 12, 2022 in an extremely learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Sanjay Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh Through Its Chief Secretary & Ors in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 338 of 2006 asked the Allahabad High Court Chief Justice to nominate within two weeks a District Judge or Additional District Judge to work on a day to day basis for determining the compensation payable to the families of the victims of the fire that broke out during a consumer fair in Meerut in 2006. The Apex Court was hearing a plea that was filed by the kin of the victims of the fire that broke out around 5.40 pm on April 10, 2006 that is the last day of the India Brand Consumer Show organised by Mrinal Events and Expositions at Victoria Park in Meerut. A total of 65 people had died in the fire that broke out and more than 160 people were injured. The Court upheld the report’s recommendation holding the organisers and the State liable to apportion the liability at 60:40.

To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced 52-page judgment authored by Justice Hemant Gupta for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of himself and Justice V Ramasubramanian sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The present writ petition has been preferred by the victims of the fire tragedy which occurred on 10.4.2006 at about 5:40 p.m., the last day of the India Brand Consumer Show organized at Victoria Park, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh by Mrinal Events and Expositions who are being represented as Respondents 10 to 12 herein. For the sake of convenience, Respondents 10-12 are being collectively referred as Organizers. This unfortunate incident claimed the lives of 65 persons and left 161 or more with burn injuries.

Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 2 that:
The State of Uttar Pradesh appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice O.P. Garg (Retired) in terms of provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 19521 vide order dated 2.6.2006 with the following terms of reference:

  1. To find out the facts, causes on account of which the aforesaid accident occurred;
  2. To decide the ways and means to keep up the situation in control;
  3. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination of liability and the extent thereof;
  4. Measures to be adopted to avoid the occurrence of such incident in future.


In hindsight, the Bench then recalls in para 3 that:
The above appointed Commission submitted its report on 5.6.2007 wherein various witnesses and documents produced were examined. Such report was not found to be sustainable in the order dated 31.7.2014 reported as Sanjay Gupta & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 283. This Court while rejecting the proceedings conducted by the Commission under the Inquiry Act, appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha (Retired) as a one-man Commission as it was found that the Organizers were summoned after examination of almost 45 witnesses and were not afforded opportunity of cross-examination. It was held as under:

11. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is difficult to sustain the report. We are obliged to state here that in course of hearing, we had asked the learned counsel for the parties that in case the report of the Commission would be set aside, the Commission has to proceed after following the provisions of the Act. The said position was acceded to. On a further suggestion being made, the learned counsel for the parties had fairly agreed for appointment of another retired Judge as Commission.

The learned counsel for the parties had suggested certain names in sealed covers but there was no commonality. Regard being had to the gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the tragedy, on due deliberation we appoint Justice S.B. Sinha, formerly a Judge of this Court, as the one-man Commission. It is agreed by the learned counsel for the parties that the witnesses, who were examined by the previous Commission and not cross-examined by Respondents 10 to 12, their depositions shall be treated as examination-in-chief and they shall be made available for cross-examination by the respondent. It has also been conceded that the documents which have been marked as exhibits, unless there is a cavil over the same, they shall be treated as exhibited documents.

14. The question that we would like to pose is whether this Court should wait for the Commission’s report and then direct the State Government to pay the amount of compensation to the grieved and affected persons, who have been waiting for the last eight years, or should they get certain sum till the matter is finalised. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take into consideration the submission of Mr Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, that as far as Respondents 10 to 12 are concerned, no liability can be fastened under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, and definitely not at this stage. As far as first part of the submission is concerned, we keep it open to be dealt with after the report is obtained by this Court. As far as the second aspect is concerned, we shall deal with it after we address the issue of public law remedy and the liability of the State in a case of this nature.

24. Mr Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the liability cannot be fastened on the organisers under Article 32 of the Constitution as the grievance is not tenable against the private persons and, in any case, the organisers cannot vicariously be held liable for the act of the contractors.

25. We have noted these submissions but we are not intending to address these aspects in praesenti. Be it stated, with regard to the precise exact quantum, liability of the organisers, liability of the contractors and, if found liable by this Court, would depend upon the eventual verdict, regard being had to the report of the Commission. As stated hereinbefore, we have to see whether the State and its authorities prima facie are responsible to make them liable to pay the compensation. The issue of apportionment would come afterwards.

Most commendably, the Bench holds in para 21 that:
The contentions raised by Mr. Bhushan are substantially same as were raised before Delhi High Court in Assn. of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, which were not accepted. This Court in appeal had accepted the view of the High Court except to the extent of the finding of negligence against certain respondents. We are in complete agreement with the findings recorded by this Court in appeal that:
Where life and personal liberty have been violated, the absence of any statutory provision for compensation in the statute is of no consequence. Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most sacred right preserved and protected under the Constitution, violation of which is always actionable and there is no necessity of statutory provision as such for preserving that right. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is, therefore, very high.

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then holds in para 34 that:
The U.P. Fire Service Act, 1944, though is more concerned with the duties and responsibilities of the fire officers, also talks about liability of the property owners to pay compensation. Section 16 of the said Act contemplates that any person whose property catches fire on account of any act of his own or of his agent done deliberately or negligently shall be liable to pay compensation to any other person suffering damage to his property. The Organizers were the persons responsible for organizing the exhibition and informing people to visit such exhibition after purchase of the ticket. Therefore, the property of the Organizers has caught fire on account of their negligence and hence are liable to pay compensation.

It deserves mentioning that the Bench then points out in para 35 that:
The Uttar Pradesh Fire Prevention and Fire Safety Act, 2005 was enacted to make more effective provisions for fire prevention and fire safety measures in certain buildings and premises in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The occupier as defined in Section 2(g) of the said Act includes any person who for the time being is paying or is liable to pay to the owner rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building in respect of which such rent is paid or is payable. The Organizers have paid Rs.40,000/- for obtaining permission to conduct exhibition in the lawns of the college, therefore, the Organizers are occupiers within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act permits the nominated authority to enter and inspect the building or premises at any time for ascertaining the adequacy or contravention of fire prevention and fire safety measures. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 further contemplates assistance by the owner or occupier to the nominated authority for carrying out the inspection under sub-section (1) of Section 3. The nominated authority has to give a report of any inspection made by it under Section 3 to the District Magistrate. Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act read thus:

  1. The nominated authority may, after giving three hours notice to the occupier or, if there be no occupier, to the owner of any building having such height as may be prescribed or premises, enter and inspect the said building or premises at any time between sunrise and sunset where such inspection appears necessary for ascertaining the adequacy or contravention of fire prevention and fire safety measures:

    Provided that the nominated authority may enter into and inspect any building or premises at any time if it appears to it to be expedient and necessary to do so in order to ensure safety of life and property.
  2. the nominated authority shall be provided with all possible assistance by the owner or occupier, as the case may be, of the building or premises for carrying out the inspection under subsection (1).
  3. When any building or premises used as a human dwelling is entered under sub-section (1) due regard shall be paid to the social and religious sentiments of the occupiers; and before any apartment in the actual occupancy of any woman, who according to the custom does not appear in public, is entered under subsection (1), notice shall be given to her that she is at liberty to withdraw, and every reasonable facility shall be afforded to her for withdrawing.
  4. (1) The nominated authority shall, after the completion of the inspection of the building or premises under section 3, record its views on the deviations from, or the contraventions of, the building bye-laws with regard to the fire prevention and fire safety measures and inadequacy of such measures provided therein with reference to the height of the building or the nature of activities carried on in such building or premises and issue a notice to the owner or occupier of such building or premises directing him to undertake such measures as may be specified in the notice.

    (2) The nominated authority shall also give a report of any inspection made by it under section 3 to the District Magistrate.

Of course, the Bench then hastens to add in para 36 that:
The Organisers have not applied for permission under the said Act nor had the nominated authority caused the inspection, therefore, the Organizers and the State have been rightly saddled with liability for not taking precautions as mandated by the statute.

Quite rightly, the Bench then holds in para 38 that:
Though the power is to remove any building, tent or structure, or any tree which is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the neighborhood, such power could be exercised only after the structure is raised. Thus, in case any structure is raised without the permission of the civil administration, the Organizers could be directed to remove such tent or structure. Therefore, it was a pre-requisite condition for the Organizers to inform the civil administration about the structure which they are putting up for the purpose of exhibition so that the civil administration does not pass an order subsequently for removal of such structure so as to avoid any disruption on account of order which may be passed by civil administration.

Be it noted, the Bench then explicitly states in para 50 that:
We find that the appointment of the Court Commissioner was though to substitute the Commissioner appointed under the Inquiry Act, but under the Inquiry Act, the Court could not appoint a Commissioner. Such power is conferred only on the executive and the legislature. Thus, the jurisdiction exercised in appointing Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha (Retd.) was vesting with this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. It was a Court Commission to find out the factual positions on the questions of reference. We do not find any merit in the argument that the appointment of the Court Commissioner was as a Commissioner of Inquiry under the Inquiry Act and the same is made out from the fact that this Court has sought comments from the State on the basis of the report so furnished.

Most forthrightly, the Bench then stipulates in para 51 that:
The victims or their families visited exhibition on the invitation of the Organizers and not that of the Contractor. The Organizers were supposed to make arrangements for putting up the exhibition hall, providing electricity and water and also the food stalls for the facility of the victims/visitors. They cannot now take shelter on the ground that the Contractor who was given work order on 9.3.2006 was an independent contractor and the victims should seek remedy from him. As observed earlier, the contractor has worked for the Organizers and not for the victims. Hence, the Organizers alone are responsible to protect the life and liberty of the victims.

For sake of clarity, the Bench then states in para 52 that:
The argument of Mr. Bhushan that the Court Commissioner has not given any conclusive finding on the cause of the fire is not relevant in determining the civil liability. The maxim res ipsa loquitur would be applicable as organizing an exhibition of such substantial magnitude without proper and adequate safety factors which may endanger the life of the visitors, has been rightly found by the Court Commissioner, an act of negligence including negligence of the officers of the State.

Needless to say, the Bench then notes in para 55 that:
The said aspect of res ipsa loquitur has also been commented upon by the Court Commissioner holding the Organizers and the State liable to apportion the liability. Thus, we are of the opinion that the report of the one-man Commission is not suffering from any infirmity so as to absolve the Organizers from their responsibility of organizing the exhibition.

As we see, the Bench then remarkably mentions in para 56 that:
In terms of the order passed, as mentioned above, the Commission has submitted its report and apportioned the liability between the Organizers and the State as 60:40. No dispute was raised regarding percentage of liability determined by any of the party to the present proceedings. Therefore, what remains to be seen now, is the question of compensation payable to the victims and/or their families.

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 57 that:
The State has paid Rs.2 lakhs each as ex-gratia compensation to the families of the deceased, Rs.1 lakh each for the persons who suffered serious injuries and Rs.50,000/- each for the persons suffering from minor injuries whereas the Union of India has paid ex-gratia compensation of Rs.1 lakh each for the deceased and Rs.50,000/- each for those with serious injuries. In terms of the order of this Court, the State has paid Rs.5 lakhs each to the deceased, Rs.2 lakhs each to the victims suffering serious injuries and Rs. 75,000/- each to the victims suffering minor injuries, apart from the amount paid by the Union of India.

It is worth noting that the Bench then enunciates in para 58 that:
The list of deceased and injured persons has been produced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The amount of compensation payable to each of the victim including the families of the deceased have not been computed and such amount is required to be computed in accordance with the principles of just compensation as in the case of accident under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 59 that:
We, therefore, request the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court to entrust the work of determination of compensation to a Judicial Officer in the rank of District Judge/Additional District Judge at Meerut within two weeks of the order of this Court to work exclusively on the question of determination of the compensation on day-to-day basis. The High Court shall provide all necessary infrastructure to enable the Officer to discharge his duties. The nominated Judicial Officer may permit the parties to lead such evidence as may be permissible. We hope that the nominated Judicial Officer shall calculate the amount of compensation and forward the report to this Court for consideration in respect of compensation in accordance with law. The amount paid by the State and a sum of Rs.30 Lakhs deposited by the Organizers has been disbursed to the victims. The said amount, excluding the ex-gratia payments made, be taken into consideration while determination of the amount payable by the Organizers and the State. List after four months.

In sum, what the Apex Court has finally ruled fixing liability of 40:60 on State and organizers to compensate victims must be implemented. The Apex Court has ruled this case on merits and it has cited rational reasons and so also relevant case laws like Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association v. Union of India & Ors 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 10273, DAV Managing Committee & Anr. V. Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 494, MS Grewal & Anr. V. Deep Chand Sood & Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 151 among others to duly substantiate what it held so very rightly here. No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

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Sanjeev Sirohi Advocate
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