Author Name:   saarth1989

Departmental bias is something which is inherent in the administrative process, and if it is not effectively checked, it may negate the very concept of fairness in the administrative proceeding...

Judicial approach towards departmental bias

While every State today would like to call itself a welfare state almost up to the end of nineteenth century most states contented themselves with being “police” State. Their primary function was to provide law and order. The idea of bringing a welfare state instead of police state was brought by the great political thinker, Laski.

Now what exactly is a welfare State??

In the words of Abraham Lincoln,

“A community where the state power is deliberately used to modify the normal play of economic forces so as to obtain a more equal distribution of income for every citizen, a basic minimum irrespective of the market value of his work and his property is known as the welfare state.”

The welfare state guarantees a minimum standard of subsistence without removing incentives to private enterprise, and it brings about a limited redistribution of income by means of graduated high taxation.

So far as the nature of the welfare state is concerned, the first important thing to be kept in mind is that welfare is not a matter of charity, but a right. Secondly, unless the minds and attitude of people are attuned to the idea of the welfare state, they are apt to look upon the welfare as manna from the heaven falling into the mouths of the expectant people.

In the strictest sense, a welfare state is a government that provides for the welfare, or the well-being, of its citizens completely. Such a government is involved in citizens’ lives at every level. It provides for physical, material, and social needs rather than the people providing for their own. The purpose of the welfare state is to create economic equality or to assure equitable standards of living for all.

The welfare state provides education, housing, sustenance, healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance, sick leave or time off due to injury, supplemental income in some cases, and equal wages through price and wage controls. It also provides for public transportation, childcare, social amenities such as public parks and libraries, as well as many other goods and services. Some of these items are paid for via government insurance programs while others are paid for by taxes. And so, when a state is doing so much for its people, then it means it will have power also in its hands.

Political power is a type of power held by a group in a society which allows administration of some or all of public resources, including labour, and wealth. There are many ways to obtain possession of such power. At the nation-state level political legitimacy for political power is held by the representatives of national sovereignty. Political powers are not limited to heads of states, however the extent to which a person or group such as an insurgency, terrorist group, or multinational corporation possesses such power is related to the amount of societal influence they can wield, formally or informally. In many cases, this influence is not contained within a single state and it refers to international power.

Political scientists have frequently defined power as "the ability to influence the behaviour of others" with or without resistance.

One of the most famous references to power comes from the Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. In his words, “Political power grows from the barrel of a gun.”

In any social system, it is a fact that some give orders whist others obey. The ability to command obedience is defined as power.

Power generally stems from three sources:
Physical sanction.
Material power, based on control over resources such as wages or services.
Symbolic or normative power based on the allocation and withholding of socially desired rewards such as esteem or status.

While power ultimately rests on the threat of coercion, in most political systems some people develop the right to give orders, which they generally expect to be obeyed. Power thus becomes authority when it is recognised as legitimate - the right to give the order is accepted usually because those obeying the order believe there is some common good to be served by obedience.

When the concept of power is discussed, the two types of power will be discussed definitely. They are the arbitrary power and the discretionary power.

The expression “arbitrary” means in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.

Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua lion to its validity. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you’. This is what men in power must remember, always. Almost a quarter century back, the Supreme Court in the case of S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., indicated the test of arbitrariness and the pitfalls to be avoided in all State actions to prevent that vice, in a passage as under:”In this context it is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., it was held that if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.

In Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal and Ors., an authority, however, has to act properly for the purpose for which the power is conferred. He must take a decision in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the statutes. He must not be guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. He must not act illegally, irrationally or arbitrarily. Any such illegal, irrational or arbitrary action or decision, whether in the nature of legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial exercise of power is liable to be quashed being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Another, the constitutional power conferred on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprincipled manner; it has to be exercised for the public good. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated.

The absence of arbitrary power is the first postulate of rule of law upon which the whole Constitutional edifice is based. In a system governed by Rule of Law, discretion when conferred upon an executive authority must be confined within clearly defined limits. If the discretion is exercised without any principle or without any rule, it is a situation amounting to the antithesis of Rule of Law.

On the other hand, discretionary powers are permissive, not mandatory. They are powers granted either under statute or delegation which do not impose a duty on the decision-maker to exercise them or to exercise them in a particular way. Within certain constraints, decision-makers are able to choose whether and/or how to exercise discretionary powers. Every discretionary power vested in the executive should be exercised in a just, reasonable and fair way. That is the essence of the Rule of Law.

In United States v. Wunderlich, law has reached its first finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, and some bureaucrat. Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. At times it has been his property that has been invaded, at times his privacy; at times his liberty of movement; at times his freedom of thought; at times his life. Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of mans other invention. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law it must be governed by rule not humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful. In a state of governed by the rule of Law, discretion must be confined within clearly defined limits. A decision taken without any principle or rule is the antithesis of a decision of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of Law. Its exercise has always to be in conformity with rules.

A case of conferment of power together with a discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power and therefore it is coupled with a duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual.

Thus, power should be used reasonably in good faith and for a proper purpose. It is said that absolute power corrupts all. So, there is a chance that because of the unethical use of power, there can be violation of principles of natural justice.

Concept of Natural Justice-
The term Natural Justice has not been defined in any enactment, rules or regulations. Eminent Jurists and courts in England and India have defined and explained the concept of Natural Justice in various decisions.

The term Natural Justice has been evolved in contrast to legal justice. It is said that Natural Justice is justice in deed and in truth while legal justice is justice declared and recognized by law and enforced by courts in accordance with the procedure established by law. Natural Justice is justice based on human values and good conscience following a just and fair procedure. Legal justice is justice based on technicalities of law following the procedure established by law. Principles of Natural Justice are principles analogous to principles of equity.

Principles of natural justice control all actions of public authorities by applying rules relating to reasonableness, good faith and justice, equity and good conscience. Natural justice is a part of law which relates to administration of justice. Rules of natural justice are indeed great assurances of justice and fairness.

The underlying object of rules of natural justice is to ensure fundamental liberties and rights of subjects. They thus serve public interest. The golden rule which stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice.

Generally, no provision is found in any statute for the observance of the principles of natural justice by the adjudicating authorities. The question then arises whether the adjudicating authority is bound to follow the principles of natural justice. The law has been settled that they are the mandatory requirement and that the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. This principle is accepted in India also.

Scope and Object of the Principles of Natural Justice-
Principles of Natural Justice are the rules laid down by courts for the purpose of protecting the right of an individual against adoption of arbitrary procedure in determining questions affecting his rights by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority.

In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines regarding the scope and object of the principles of Natural Justice.

(a) These rules operate in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law but supplement the law.

(b) The aim of these rules is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.

(c) In view of their nature it is not possible to cast them in a narrow mould or fit them into a straight jacket, because that would deprive them of their flexibility or adaptability to the innumerable situations that may arise during the course of the enquiry.

(d) Whether a particular principle of Natural Justice is applicable to a particular situation will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(e) Whenever a complaint is made before the court that some principle of Natural Justice is contravened, the court has to decide whether the observance of the rule was necessary for a just decision of the case.

(f) The concept of Natural Justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause and (2) no decision shall be given against party without affording him a reasonable hearing. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. In the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of Natural Justice.

(g) Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of Natural Justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned.

(h) If the purpose of the rules of Natural Justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.

(i) Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which are considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character.

(j) Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in quasi-judicial enquiry.

First basic principle– ‘No one shall be a judge in his own cause.’
The Disciplinary Authority who conducts the inquiry or the inquiring authority where one is appointed is a quasi-judicial authority. He acts like a judge but he is not a judge. He takes administrative action with a judicial approach, which requires administration of justice according rules, following just and fair procedure.

He shall be independent, impartial, fair and objective. A person with a foreclosed mind or a person who has prejudged the issue or predetermined to punish the delinquent should not act as inquiry officer. Similarly a person who is a complainant, or witness or prosecutor cannot act as a judge.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, a Constable in the Utter Pradesh Police Force who was officiating as Head Constable at the material time was placed under suspension on 15.03.1948 as he was suspected to be responsible for creation of a forged letter purporting to have been issued selecting him for training in the Police Training College. A Departmental enquiry was started against the respondent and Shri B.N.Bhalla, the District Superintendent of Police held the trial and found him guilty and passed an order of dismissal against him. Departmental appeal and revision were dismissed.

The main contention of the Constable before the Supreme Court was that Sri B.N.Bhalla, who presided over the trial, also gave his own evidence in the proceedings at two stages and had thus become disqualified from continuing as the judge, as he was found to be biased against the respondent. The examination of Shri Bhalla became necessary to contradict a witness who denied at the inquiry a statement he had made earlier in the presence of Shri Bhalla. Accordingly, Shri Bhalla had his testimony recorded by a Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The Supreme Court, while laying down that a person cannot act both as a Judge and witness, observed as follows:
The District Superintendent of Police examined a certain witness in the course of the enquiry. It seems that witness’s evidence was considered a vital link in the chain of evidence against the respondent. The Dist. Superintendent of Police reached the conclusion that the witness had turned hostile. He may have been right about that, but he also considered it necessary to refute this evidence and make good the lacuna by bringing other material on record. Apparently, no other witness was available. So, the Dist. Superintendent of Police who seems to have personal knowledge about the facts, stepped down from the Bench and got his testimony recorded by another authority, once before charge and again after charge and each time after that was done, stepped back from the Bench in order solemnly to decide whether he should believe his own testimony in preference to that of the witness who, in his judgement, had committed per jury and gone back on the truth. It hardly matters whether this was done in good faith or whether the truth lay that way because the spectacle of a Judge hopping on and off the Bench to act first, as judge, then as witness, then as judge again to determine whether he should believe himself in preference to another witness, is startling to say the least. It would doubtless delight the hearts of a Gillbert and Sulivan Comic Opera audience but will hardly inspire public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of departmental trials; and certainly not in the mind of the respondent. Even before the constitution, departmental trials were instituted to instill a sense of security in the services and inspire confidence in the public about the treatment accorded to Government servants”.

Second basic principle – ‘No one shall be condemned unheard’
The concept of reasonable opportunity extends throughout the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of framing of charges till the final order is issued.

Art.311.Cl.(2) of the Constitution of India embodies the principles of reasonable opportunity. It reads as follows:-

“No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.

Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed.”

Maxims on which the principles of natural justice are based-
The principles of natural justice are based on two maxims recognised by the English law. They are — nerno debet esse judex in pro pria causa (no one should be judge in his own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear the other side). The principle audi alteram partern, meaning— “also hear the other party”, has been treated as of fundamental nature laying down the norm which is to be implemented even by the international tribunals in their proceedings.

These are treated as fundamental principles to be observed by every judicial authority or tribunal. A judicial authority is required to be impartial and should not have any interest and secondly such authority is also required not to give any decision without hearing the other side. The concept of natural justice is bound up with this maxim. The cardinal characteristic of a judicial or quasi judicial process is the impartiality of the tribunal giving se as a corollary, to juridical qualities between the parties before it, and the latter is apt to be gravely imperilled when one of the parties has not been given opportunity to appear before it thus disturbing the equilibrium between them. The essence of the rule is notice, adequate opportunity to be heard consideration and solemn judgment.

In the past there were only two rules comprised in the principles of natural justice. The first was that no one will be judge in his own cause and second that no decision can be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing. Soon a third rule was envisaged that enquiry must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. In the course of years many more subsidiary rules came up to be added to the rules of natural justice. The rules are now extended to administrative enquiries also. The rules are also not embodied rules and what particular rule of natural justice should apply in a given case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the situation of tribunal or body of persons appointed for the purpose and, therefore, in each case a decision has to be taken whether a particular rule of natural justice was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.

Nemo in propria causa judex , esse debet, i.e. no one should be made a judge in his own cause. It is popularly known as the rule against bias. It is the minimal requirement of the natural justice that the authority giving decision must be composed of impartial persons acting fairly, without prejudice and bias. Bias means an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious, as result of some preconceived opinion or predisposition, in relation to a party or an issue. Dictionary meaning of the term “bias” suggests anything which tends a person to decide a case other than on the basis of evidences.

The rule against bias strikes against those factors which may improperly influence a judge against arriving at a decision in a particular case. This rule is based on the premises that it is against the human psychology to decide a case against his own interest. The basic objective of this rule is to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative adjudicatory process, for as per Lord Hewart CJ, in R v. Sussex, “justice should not only be done, but also manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done.”

A decision which is a result of bias is a nullity and the trial is “Coram non judice”.

Bias manifests itself variously and affects a decision in a variety of ways. It can broadly be classified into six categories:
# Personal Bias
# Pecuniary Bias
# Subject Matter Bias
# Departmental Bias
# Preconceived Notion Bias
# Bias On Account Of Obstinacy

DEPARTMENTAL BIAS-
The problem of departmental bias is something which is inherent in the administrative process, and if it is not effectively checked, it may negate the very concept of fairness in the administrative proceeding. The problem of departmental bias arises in different context- when the functions of judge and prosecutor are combined in the same department. It is not uncommon to find that the same department which initiates a matter also decides it, therefore, at times, departmental fraternity and loyalty militates against the concept of fair hearing.

This problem came up before the Supreme Court in Hari Khemu v. Dy. Commr. of Police. In this case an order was challenged on the ground that since the police department which initiated the proceedings and the department which heard and decided the case were the same, the element of departmental bias vitiated administrative action. The Court rejected the challenge on the ground that so long as the two functions (initiation and decision) were discharged by two separate officers, though they were affiliated to the same department, there was no bias.

In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC, the order of the government nationalizing road transport was challenged in this case. One of the grounds for challenge was that the Secretary of the Transport Department who gave the hearing was biased, being the person who initiated the scheme and also being the head of the department whose responsibility it was to execute it. The court quashed the order on the ground that, under the circumstances, the Secretary was biased, and hence no fair hearing could be expected.

Similarly, in Krishna Bus Service v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court quashed the notification of the government which had conferred powers of a Deputy Superintendent of Police on the General Manager, Haryana Roadways in matters of inspection of vehicles on the ground of departmental bias.
The facts of this case were that some private bus operators had alleged that the General Manager of Haryana Roadways who was the rival in business in the State could not be expected to discharge his duties in a fair and reasonable manner and would be too lenient in inspecting the vehicles belonging to his own department. The reason for quashing the notification according to the Supreme Court was the conflict between the duty and the interest of the department and the consequential erosion of public confidence in administrative justice.

The test of likelihood of bias which has been applied in a number of cases is based on the reasonable apprehension of a reasonable man fully cognizant of the facts. The courts have quashed on the strength of the ‘reasonable suspicion’ of the party aggrieved without any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed. The tests of “real likelihood” and “reasonable suspicion” are really inconsistent with each other. The reviewing authority must take a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. If right-minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an enquiry officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjuncture would not be enough.There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not enquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision.

Where members of the Public Service Commission directly participated in the selection of candidates where their own relatives have actually been selected with high ratings in the interview, test, it was held that the selection suffers from bias and is liable to be struck down. It was held that in a fair recruitment to the Civil Services the selection must not only be devoid of bias but there must also be no reasonable likelihood of bias. It is not necessary for the petitioners to prove beyond reasonable doubt the factum of bias or unfairness. It is sufficient if they can show a reasonable possibility or likelihood of bias and partisanship.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in M.Koteswara Rao v. Sr. Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., after discussing the case law on the subject laid down the following principles in regard to bias –
1. Every Judge, authority, arbitrator, or a body or person having power to decide, disputed questions of law and facts shall display fair play in action.

2. He acquires disqualification if he has interest (either pecuniary or otherwise) in the proceedings or conducts in a biased manner so as to create real likelihood of bias.

3. The bias need not be established as a fact. It is sufficient if there was real likelihood of bias or bona fide suspicion of bias or there was substantial possibility of bias.

4. The measuring rod of actual bias or real likelihood of bias is that a reasonable and fair-minded person adequately appraised of all relevant facts may reasonably and bonafidely think that there was real likelihood of bias and that bias cannot be inferred on vague suspicions of whimsical, cupidous and unreasonable persons.

5. Bias may be apparent or inherent in the proceedings and there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias.

6. Bias may arise under various circumstances viz., pecuniary, affinity, consanguinity, friendship or hostility, subordinate status etc. It may be personal bias or departmental or administrative bias or objectionable bias (e.g. prejudging the issue).

7. Principles of waiver apply to the rule against bias provided the objection is taken as soon as the party prejudiced knows the facts which entitle him to object. However, in cases where even though true facts are known, but if he establishes that he was unaware that he was entitled to take objection, the principle will not apply.

8. The principle has no application where the authority discharges the function under a statute or when the doctrine of necessary is invoked.

9. The proceedings or decisions afflicted with bias are wholly void.

Similarly, in Election Commission of India v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, it was with regard to misappropriation of funds by J. Jayalalitha. In order to disqualify her from contesting elections under Art.191 read with S.9 of Representation of Peoples Act 1995, her personal enemy Dr. Subramaniam Swamy filed a petition before the Governor. Now, the Governor u/A. 192 has to follow such procedures such as consult the Election commission and seek their opinion. In this case, the Governor did just that. The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) was T.N. Seshan, who happened to be a close acquaintance of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy. So J. Jayalalitha went to the Madras High Court. The division bench of the High Court held that Seshan was in a position to act biased. The Bench observed that in view of the appointment of additional two members on the EC, the EC could give its opinion through members other than CEC. But the lacuna in this approach was that a majority decision is required. It was thus decided that on account of divided opinion between the EC’s, then applying the doctrine of necessity the final opinion of the CEC must be sought.

CONCLUSION-
As de Smith, Woolf and Jowell state:
‘The decision maker should not be biased or prejudiced in a way that precludes fair and genuine consideration being given to the arguments advanced by the parties. Although perfect objectivity may be an unrealistic objective, the rule against bias thus aims at preventing a hearing being a sham or a ritual or a mere exercise.’

Lord Denning, once said that ‘the reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking ‘the judge was biased.’ Being prejudiced or exhibiting favouritism is but a human nature and it is no conundrum that it is a regular feature in the deliverance of justice. Administrative law has always been considered to be an informal form of justice as it has no necessity for adherence to specific procedures or rules laid down in a statute book. This feature has made administration more realistic and accessible forum for addressing citizen grievances. But often, the lack of a guiding force is apparent when we witness the slip of the judiciary to eliminate bias that comes in unknowingly. Bias can be called an uncertainty that plagues administrative law.

According to me, if the rule against bias is applied blindly, then it will be no surprise that almost all adjudicators will be disqualified on that account and the decisions will be invalidated consequently. So what occupies a greater priority is not the disqualification of a judge per se but the identification of such a bias in decision-making. The most often asked question is that how can the general public perceive bias in the mind of the judges, despite the various tests for identification of bias. The public is entitled to have confidence in the judiciary and is also entitled to impartial adjudication. This confidence is perceivable when the facts of the case are such that they create a cloud of doubt in the mind of the public. That would be the cardinal identification of bias.

A mere connection to a party will not be a ground for vitiation. It must be borne in mind that judges are co-human beings and to err is human. It is up to the conscience of the judges to prevent the malign bias to disrupt the ongoing process of deliverance of justice both in the judicial sense as well as the administrative sense.

# Eddy Asirvatham, Political Theory, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd.), 2006, p 162.
# Eddy Asirvatham, Political Theory, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd.), 2006 ,p 164
# M/s Sharma Transport Rep. by Shri D.P.Sharma v. Government of A.P. & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 322.
# (1967) 2 SCR 703.
# (1991) 1 SCC 212.
# AIR 1990 SC 1402.
# Available at www.legalserviceindia.com visited on October 9, 2010.
# (1951) 342 US 98.
# John Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2528.
# A.P. Aggarwal v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 3689.
# P.V. Ramakrishna, ‘Principles of Natural Justice’, http://www.aapssindia.org/articles/vpII3/vpII3h.html, visited on October 7, 2010.
# P.V. Ramakrishna, ‘Principles of Natural Justice’, http://www.aapssindia.org/articles/vpII3/vpII3h.html, visited on October 7, 2010.
# Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480.
# R. v. University of Cambridge, (1723) 1 Str 557.
# In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597: (1978)2 SCR 621, Beg, C.J. observed: “It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made there under for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action.”
# Pitchaiah v. Andhra University, AIR 1961 AP 465.
# AIR 1976 SC 150.
# Available on http://lawreports.wordpress.com/ visited on October 10, 2010.
# AIR 1958 SC 86.
# Available at http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l25-Nemo-in-propria-causa-judex,-esse-debet-THE-RULE-AGAINST-BIAS.html  visited on October 9, 2010.
# Gangadharan v. Kerala Rsheries Corpn. Ltd., (1983) 2 115 360 (Ker HC).
# Available at http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l25-Nemo-in-propria-causa-judex,-esse-debet-THE-RULE-AGAINST-BIAS.html visited on October 9, 2010.
# (1924)1 KB 256.
# Available at www.legalserviceindia.com visited on October 9, 2010.
# AIR 1956 SC 559.
# AIR 1959 SC 308.
# (1985) 3 SCC 711.
# P.V. Ramakrishna, ‘Principles of Natural Justice’, http://www.aapssindia.org/articles/vpII3/vpII3h.html, visited on October 7, 2010.
# S. Parthasarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2701.
# Subhash Chandar Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454.
# 1997(3) ALT 68.
# (1996) 4 SCC 104.

The  author can be reached at: nirma@legalserviceindia.com

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