4. That the appointment of present Attorney General (Mr. Milon Banerjee) was challenged before the Delhi High Court and the petition was dismissed in limine. The appointment of Mr. R.P. Goel, Advocate General of U.P. who has passed the age of 62 at the time of appointment was also dismissed.

5. That in the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Sri JV. K.S. Chaudhary, Sir Rishi Ram, Pt. Kanhaiya Lal Mishra, Sri Shanti Swaroop Bhatnagar and several others were appointed as Advocate General after crossing the age of 62 years. There were several Advocate Generals in India who were appointed after 62 years.

23. The State of Uttrakhand was a part of the State of U.P. a few years ago. In the State of U.P., a large number of Advocate Generals appointed were beyond 62 years of age at the time of their appointment. The petitioner, a local practicing lawyer, ought to have bestowed some care before filing this writ petition in public interest under Article 226 of the Constitution.

24. The controversy raised by the petitioner in this case was decided 58 years ago in the judgment of Karkare (supra) which was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court way back in 1962. Unfortunately, the same controversy has been repeatedly raised from time to time in various High Courts. When the controversy is no longer res-integra and the same controversy is raised repeatedly, then it not only wastes the precious time of the Court and prevent the Court from deciding other deserving cases, but also has the immense potentiality of demeaning a very important constitutional office and person who has been appointed to that office.

25. In our considered view, it is a clear case of the abuse of process of court in the name of the Public Interest Litigation. In order to curb this tendency effectively, it has now become imperative to examine all connected issues of public interest litigation by an authoritative judgment in the hope that in future no such petition would be filed and/or entertained by the Court.

26. To settle the controversy, we deem it appropriate to deal with different definitions of the Public Interest Litigation in various countries. We would also examine the evolution of the public interest litigation.

DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

27. Public Interest Litigation has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as under:- Public Interest - Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, state or national government....

28. Advanced Law Lexicon has defined `Public Interest Litigation' as under:-

The expression `PIL' means a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community has pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.

29. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined public interest litigation in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows: Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others. (M/s Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra Ors. - AIR 2008 SC 913, para 19).

30. This court in People's Union for Democratic Rights & Others v. Union of India & Others (1982) 3 SCC 235 defined `Public Interest Litigation' and observed that the Public interest litigation is a cooperative or collaborative effort by the petitioner, the State of public authority and the judiciary to secure observance of constitutional or basic human rights, benefits and privileges upon poor, downtrodden and vulnerable sections of the society.

ORIGIN OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
31. The public interest litigation is the product of realization of the constitutional obligation of the court.

32. All these petitions are filed under the big banner of the public interest litigation. In this view of the matter, it has become imperative to examine what are the contours of the public interest litigation? What is the utility and importance of the public interest litigation? Whether similar jurisdiction exists in other countries or this is an indigenously developed jurisprudence? Looking to the special conditions prevalent in our country, whether the public interest litigation should be encouraged or discouraged by the courts? These are some of the questions which we would endeavour to answer in this judgment.

33. According to our opinion, the public interest litigation is an extremely important jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The Courts in a number of cases have given important directions and passed orders which have brought positive changes in the country. The Courts' directions have immensely benefited marginalized sections of the society in a number of cases. It has also helped in protection and preservation of ecology, environment, forests, marine life, wildlife etc. etc. The court's directions to some extent have helped in maintaining probity and transparency in the public life.

34. This court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review realized that a very large section of the society because of extreme poverty, ignorance, discrimination and illiteracy had been denied justice for time immemorial and in fact they have no access to justice. Pre-dominantly, to provide access to justice to the poor, deprived, vulnerable, discriminated and marginalized sections of the society, this court has initiated, encouraged and propelled the public interest litigation. The litigation is upshot and product of this court's deep and intense urge to fulfill its bounded duty and constitutional obligation.

35. The High Courts followed this Court and exercised similar jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. The courts expanded the meaning of right to life and liberty guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution. The rule of locus standi was diluted and the traditional meaning of `aggrieved person' was broadened to provide access to justice to a very large section of the society which was otherwise not getting any benefit from the judicial system. We would like to term this as the first phase or the golden era of the public interest litigation. We would briefly deal with important cases decided by this Court in the first phase after broadening the definition of `aggrieved person'. We would also deal with cases how this Court prevented any abuse of the public interest litigation?

36. This Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 298 at page 317, held that our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through `class actions', `public interest litigation', and `representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concepts of `cause of action', `person aggrieved' and individual litigation are becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions.

37. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others AIR 1984 SC 802, this court entertained a petition even of unregistered Association espousing the cause of over down- trodden or its members observing that the cause of little Indians can be espoused by any person having no interest in the matter.

38. In the said case, this court further held that where a public interest litigation alleging that certain workmen are living in bondage and under inhuman conditions is initiated it is not expected of the Government that it should raise preliminary objection that no fundamental rights of the petitioners or the workmen on whose behalf the petition has been filed, have been infringed. On the contrary, the Government should welcome an inquiry by the Court, so that if it is found that there are in fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are not bonded in the strict sense of the term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 but they are made to provide forced labour or any consigned to a life of utter deprivation and degradation, such a situation can be set right by the Government.

39. Public interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social and economic justice which is the signature tune of our Constitution. The Government and its officers must welcome public interest litigation because it would provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor and the down-trodden are getting their social and economic entitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victims of deception and exploitation at the hands of strong and powerful sections of the community and whether social and economic justice has become a meaningful reality for them or it has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality, so that in case the complaint in the public interest litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge of their constitutional obligation root out exploitation and injustice and ensure to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements.

40. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd., Sindri & Others v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 844, this court observed that public interest litigation is part of the process of participative justice and `standing' in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial doorsteps.

41. In Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR 1989 SC 549, this court observed that the public interest litigation is for making basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social, economic and political justice.

EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA

42. The origin and evolution of Public Interest Litigation in India emanated from realization of constitutional obligation by the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the society - the poor and the marginalized sections of the society. This jurisdiction has been created and carved out by the judicial creativity and craftsmanship. In M. C. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR 1987 SC 1086, this Court observed that Article 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue direction, order or writ for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Instead, it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people. The court asserted that, in realization of this constitutional obligation, it has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights. The Court realized that because of extreme poverty, a large number of sections of society cannot approach the court. The fundamental rights have no meaning for them and in order to preserve and protect the fundamental rights of the marginalized section of society by judicial innovation, the courts by judicial innovation and creativity started giving necessary directions and passing orders in the public interest.

43. The development of public interest litigation has been extremely significant development in the history of the Indian jurisprudence. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970's loosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit filing of petitions on behalf of marginalized and deprived sections of the society by public spirited individuals, institutions and/or bodies. The higher Courts exercised wide powers given to them under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The sort of remedies sought from the courts in the public interest litigation goes beyond award of remedies to the affected individuals and groups. In suitable cases, the courts have also given guidelines and directions. The courts have monitored implementation of legislation and even formulated guidelines in absence of legislation. If the cases of the decades of 70s and 80s are analyzed, most of the public interest litigation cases which were entertained by the courts are pertaining to enforcement of fundamental rights of marginalized and deprived sections of the society. This can be termed as the first phase of the public interest litigation in India.

44. The Indian Supreme Court broadened the traditional rule of standing and the definition of person aggrieved.

45. In this judgment, we would like to deal with the origin and development of public interest litigation. We deem it appropriate to broadly divide the public interest litigation in three phases.

Phase-I: It deals with cases of this Court  where directions and orders were passed primarily to protect fundamental rights under Article 21 of the marginalized groups and sections of the society who because of extreme poverty, illiteracy and ignorance cannot approach this court or the High Courts.

Phase-II: It deals with the cases relating to protection, preservation of ecology, environment, forests, marine life, wildlife, mountains, rivers, historical monuments etc. etc.

Phase-III: It deals with the directions issued by the Courts in maintaining the probity, transparency and integrity in governance.

46. Thereafter, we also propose to deal with the aspects of abuse of the Public Interest Litigation and remedial measures by which its misuse can be prevented or curbed. DISCUSSION OF SOME IMPORTANT CASES OF PHASE-I

47. The court while interpreting the words person aggrieved in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Others (1976) 1 SCC 671 observed that the traditional rule is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule.

48. The rule of locus standi was relaxed in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar & Others 1976 SCR 306. The court observed as under:

Traditionally used to the adversary system, we search for individual persons aggrieved. But a new class of litigation public interest litigation- where a section or whole of the community is involved (such as consumers' organisations or NAACP-National Association for Advancement of Coloured People-in America), emerges in a developing country like ours, this pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of life. xxx xxx xxx The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.

49. The court in this case observed that procedural prescriptions are handmaids, not mistresses of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which Courts must view procession deviances.

50. In The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai & Others AIR 1976 SC 1455, this Court made conscious efforts to improve the judicial access for the masses by relaxing the traditional rule of locus standi.

51. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & OthersAIR 1978 SC 1675, the Court departed from the traditional rule of standing by authorizing community litigation. The Court entertained a writ petition from a prisoner, a disinterested party, objecting to the torture of a fellow prisoner. The Court entertained the writ after reasoning that these 'martyr' litigations possess a beneficent potency beyond the individual litigant and their consideration on the wider representative basis strengthens the rule of law. Significantly, citing people's vicarious involvement in our justice system with a broad-based concept of locus standi so necessary in a democracy where the masses are in many senses weak, the Court permitted a human rights organization to intervene in the case on behalf of the victim.

52. In Hussainara Khatoon & Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1369, P. N. Bhagwati, J. has observed that today, unfortunately, in our country the poor are priced out of the judicial system with the result that they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to (sic) about changes in their life conditions and to deliver justice to them. The poor in their contact with the legal system have always been on the wrong side of the line. They have always come across 'law for the poor rather than law of the poor'. The law is regarded by them as something mysterious and forbidding--always taking something away from them and not as a positive and constructive social device for changing the social economic order and improving their life conditions by conferring rights and benefits on them. The result is that the legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker section of the community.

53. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration AIR 1980 SC 1535, a prisoner sent a telegram to a judge complaining of forced handcuff on him and demanded implicit protection against humiliation and torture. The court gave necessary directions by relaxing the strict rule of locus standi.

54. In Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand & Others AIR 1980 SC 1622, Krishna Iyer, J. relaxed the rule of locus standi:

The truth is that a few profound issues of processual jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal system face us and we must zero-in on them as they involve problems of access to justice for the people beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian vintage. If the center of gravity of justice is to shift, as the Preamble to the Constitution mandates, from the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community orientation of public interest litigation, these issues must be considered.....